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Executive Summary

Lawmakers are contemplating making changes to patent law and procedure to curb abusive
litigation and demand practices. One of the most important constituents for them to keep in mind is
small, innovative companies. The impact of the patent system on startups, and in particular high-tech
startups, is crucial because they are a key source of new jobs and innovation. According to Engine and
the Kauffman Foundation, “Though they start lean, new high-tech companies grow rapidly in the early
years, adding thousands of jobs along the way.”1
Startups also have a unique perspective on patent assertion, with the potential to be helped as
well as harmed by entities that assert patents as a business, referred to in this report interchangeably
as patent assertion entities (PAEs) and non-practicing entities (NPEs).2 Companies with less than $10M
in revenue comprise 55% of unique defendants to PAE suits. Startups, with their slim margins, focused
operations, and high rates of innovation, can arguably least afford to engage in expensive litigation to
defend against patent claims or stop incumbents from copying their innovations. But they can also gain
from being able to monetize their patents through NPEs.3
The first part of this report describes the experiences of startups with patent assertion based on
surveys of about 300 venture capitalists and venture-backed startups conducted in 2013. It also reports
on companion surveys of patent litigators and large-company patent counsel in 2013, and a non-random,
non-representative survey of startups conducted in 2012 for a total of over 1,100 respondents. Due to the
difficulty of reaching a representative population, these results are not generalizable to all start-ups and
startup investors, but instead serve as a window into their experiences and views. The second part of the
report describes existing and potential legislative, judicial, and market-based responses and recommends
how they may be tailored to better meet the needs of startups and resource-poor companies.
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According to survey responses, patents for novel
inventions play a generally positive and at times crucial
role for startups. They help to transfer technology,
enable investment, and improve exits, particularly in
bio/pharma industries. But patent assertions by NPEs,
which at times hit startups when they are least able
to fight them—on the eve of a funding or acquisition
event, or, 40% of the time, in the context of the startups’
customers—can have significant and at times devastating
impacts on companies. Though partnering with NPEs
to monetize patents can be beneficial to companies as
well, the benefits do not appear to offset the harms,
according to survey responses and VC interviewees
whose companies had been sold to and been sued by
NPEs.4 Furthermore, many survey respondents do not
find these to be socially productive assertions—but
rather on the basis of patents that, though they may be
valid, are viewed as frivolous or overbroad.
Though the risks associated with patents were described
as feeling “unbounded,” startups are routinely expected
to absorb these risks in their dealings with acquirers,
investors, and customers. Overall, these assertions have
added friction to technology transactions, reduced
the value of pursued startups, and triggered large
indemnities, according to study subjects.
More specifically, we found:
Finding 1: Based on survey responses, 75% of surveyed
venture capitalists (VCs) and 20% of venture-backed
startups with patent experience have been impacted
by an NPE demand; nearly 90% of all tech VCs have
been impacted. The demand was based on the startup’s
adoption of another’s technology 40% of the time.
Low quality and software patents were identified as
problematic.
Finding 2: Although NPE assertions are perceived as
motivated primarily by money, respondents reported
routinely experiencing non-financial consequences
including delays in hiring, meeting milestones, and
business line pivots and exits.
4

Finding 3: Most VC respondents believe patents are
important for innovation. An estimated 5% of startups
have sold their patents to NPEs, experiencing positive
benefits from doing so. However, most surveyed VCs,
including the small number whose companies have sold
to NPEs, believe that NPEs are harmful for innovation.
Finding 4: Startup concerns with patent enforcement
go beyond NPEs and extend to the disadvantages
startups suffer relative to larger incumbents as a result
of poor patent quality, high costs, and delays associated
with the patent system, survey respondents told us. The
inability of startups to defend their own patents and
suits brought by “patent predators,” larger companies
that sue with anti-competitive motives, also presented
specific concerns.
To ameliorate the harms of patent assertion on small
companies, we recommend several interventions,
keeping in mind the special needs of startups, who,
with their fewer resources, less time, and greater focus
on building the business, are at a relative disadvantage
when patent processes are expensive, slow, or require
deep patent expertise (or “patent game”-playing skills).
These include:
Recommendation 1: Fully fund the PTO and its
quality initiatives including tightening functional
claiming and expand low-cost access to the PTO’s
transitional program and other forms of post-grant
review by reducing fees for small and micro entities and
supporting and prioritizing collaborative challenges to
patents asserted against large numbers of defendants,
particularly by downstream users and small entities.
Recommendation 2: Make patent cases about the
merits, not about who can outlast or outspend the other
side, by permitting more discretion in awarding fees and
costs for non-core discovery and promoting uniformity
and early dispositive rulings, for example by requiring
the Patent Pilot Program to implement and measure the
impact of best practices.
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Recommendation 3: Make patent risks more
manageable for startups by requiring demand letters
and complaints to disclose the real-party in interest,
claim charts, related litigations and reviews, and licenses
that could cover the target.
Recommendation 4: Make startups less attractive
targets by limiting the liability of downstream users and
the precedential value of the settlements signed by small
companies.
The report concludes with a section that covers existing
private and civil sector responses and tactics to help small
companies in their own dealings with patent assertions,
based on extensive research and interviews with defense
service providers and experts in dealing with and
bringing patent assertions against small companies.
Appendix C-1 contains a listing of 17 defense service
providers, their offerings, target client profile, and how
to engage them. Appendix C-2 describes and provides
examples of a variety of different tactics for defending
against an NPE demand, including “fighting back,”
“laying low,” and publicity, as well as comments on their
effectiveness by experienced in-house, company, and
public interest lawyers.
Finally, we include the stories and advice of five
individuals—two investors, two startup executives,
and one public interest lawyer—who have experienced
patent litigation first-hand. Their responses to assertion
are varied—one found a market-based solution—
“partnering with a troll,” others saw their companies
devalued and decimated by assertions, and another
presents the perspective of his clients who cannot afford
to use any of the patent system’s protection mechanisms.
Through them, the judges and policymakers that form
the patent system can get a glimpse of how the patent
system is being experienced in the world, and how it
may be improved.
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Findings

BACKGROUND
In order to formulate effective policymaking about patent assertion, it is important to understand
its prevalence, operations, and impacts. Recognizing this, Congress ordered a study of patent assertions
brought by non-practicing entities (NPEs), also referred to as patent assertion entities (PAEs),5 as part of
the America Invents Act.6 Attempts to quantify patent assertion have focused on the prevalence of suits
as a proportion of all patent litigations,7 the financial impact of NPEs on public and surveyed companies,8 the impact of NPEs on new product introduction,9 consumers, and innovation, and the prevalence
of software patents among asserted patents.10
While these reports have drawn primarily upon operational company data about the patent
system, there have been few efforts to systematically collect company-level data about the impact on
operations of patent assertion. This creates the risk that the policy making will be overly informed by
anecdotal reports about the impacts of patent assertion, both positive11 and negative.12
In addition to the normal barriers that limit company-level data collection,13 including trade secrecy and the need to keep operational and financial information confidential, there are a number of
obstacles to companies publicly “telling their story.” Patent “trolling” is disfavored by the popular media
and persons affiliated with certain well-known “trolls” have reported receiving threats.14 As a result, companies that benefit from patent assertion may be reluctant to speak publicly about their experiences.15
Those who have been on the receiving end of patent assertions face other barriers. When an assertion is resolved, non-disclosure agreements are typically signed.16 Speaking publicly about an ongoing dispute is unlikely to draw favor from the court. Those who have spoken negatively about a patent
troll in public believe they have been sued as a result of doing so.17 Stigma can make it difficult for companies to share their experiences.18 There may be concerns regarding clients and the sharing of sensitive
company information.19
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One of the most important constituents in the patent
system are startups, as both generators of innovation
and targets of patent suits. Startups are less likely to
have the powerful lobbies and deep experience with the
patent system than the large companies that typically
front patent debates. But what happens to startups
matters, and in particular high-tech startups. According
to Engine and the Kauffman Foundation, “high-tech
startups are a key driver of job creation throughout the
United States.”20 Specifically, the high-tech sector has
experienced a stronger share of new firm formation as
compared to the rest of the private sector during the last
three decades.21
For this reason, this report focuses on the experience
of startups with the patent system, as recounted by
venture capitalists and others that invest in and oversee
portfolios of startup companies and venture-backed
startups themselves. While only a small fraction of
companies receive VC funding every year, venture
backed companies are a large source of employment,
innovation, and new wealth.22
To access startup and venture capital experience and
opinions about patent assertion, I used anonymous,
web-based surveys and conducted phone and email
interviews with approximately 50 law-firm lawyers,
entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and large company
lawyers. This report builds upon an existing survey of
startups I conducted in 2012.23 That survey generated
223 respondents. Seventy-nine had received a patent
assertion demand and several had monetized their
patents through patent assertion entities (PAEs). While
containing a number of suggestive findings, the survey
(referred to throughout the report as ‘Chien 2012’) was
of a non-random, non-probability sample, distributed
primarily openly to a universe of readers of technology
and law and public interest/academic blogs that had to
“opt-in” in order to take the survey.
This report draws from a new survey distributed in
2013 primarily to a closed list of VC-backed startup
companies and investors in startups generated from the
10

Venture Xpert database and a comprehensive national
list of venture capitalists, soliciting their feedback on the
patent system and patent assertion. Although referred
to throughout this report as a single “survey,” one of two
versions of the survey was provided to each respondent
depending on whether they self-identified as working for
a company or investing in companies. To create a more
robust understanding of patent litigation dynamics, the
report also draws upon companion surveys that were
sent to legal counsel in large companies and in patent
litigation law firms.
As detailed in the Appendix A (Methodology), the
respondent population included 307 venture capitalist
or investors (“VCs”) and startups. Thirty-five of the
startups had received a demand. The surveyed VC
population skewed from the national average towards
early stage investors and investors in bio/pharma and
hardware/semiconductors. Of the startup participants,
73% were founders/executives, 75% of companies
reported revenue under $10M, and 93% reported fewer
than 500 employees. Due to a low response rate, the
results cannot be used to describe all companies. Still,
the numeric results in combination with the open-ended
comments offered by respondents allow us to provide
a rich analysis of how venture-backed companies are
experiencing the patent system.

FINDINGS
Finding 1. Based on survey responses, about
75% of venture capitalists and 20% of venturebacked startups with patent experience have
been impacted by an NPE demand; nearly
90% of tech VCs have been impacted. The
demand was based on the startup’s adoption of
another’s technology 40% of the time. Survey
takers identified low quality and software
patents as problematic.
One objective of this study was to document how
widespread the impacts of NPEs are among productive,
innovative companies. Studies estimate the proportion
New America Foundation

of NPE lawsuits as a percentage of all patent lawsuits
filed recently to range from 45%24 to around 60%.25
The share of unique defendants to PAE suits that have
annual revenues of $10M or less has been estimated to be
around 55%.26 However, it is not clear what proportion
of all companies is actually being impacted.27 Patent
litigants are not representative of the general population
of companies, but certain policy interventions could
have broad impact.
We asked VCs to estimate what percentage of their
portfolio companies, if any, had received NPE demands,
and asked startup executives to indicate whether they
had received any NPE demands. 75% of VCs (N=114)
indicated that at least some share of their portfolios was
impacted. The share ranged significantly by industry—
close to 90% of technology VCs (N=66), and as few
as 13% of bio/pharma or medical device VCs (N=23)
reported having an affected portfolio. As reflected in
the surveyed population, technology investing has
11

represented the bulk of venture capital investment for
some time.28
Based on taking midpoints from ranges that VCs gave,
we estimated the share of impacted companies to be 20%
(N=114). 20% was also the number reported among the
surveyed startup population (N=171).

Opportunistic Assertions
VC respondents described several patterns of assertion.
Often the timing seemed to be dictated by an event
in the company’s development—publicity/success, an
M&A or funding event, or the company’s IPO.29 The
strategy depended on the company’s profile—for
example “when a Series A or Series B is announced, this
puts the company ‘on the radar’ of NPEs,” said one VC
respondent. The success of the company exposes the
company to higher costs that are cheaper to avoid than
pay: “If you are successful you will be sued since it is
New America Foundation

“When faced with the second suit, we knew we would spend all this money again to go into this entire process, and we
would pay all that money and be worse off. So even though we had won the first time, the second time it was much more
attractive to settle—in the low seven figures—than to fight.
“We had run out of cash and were in talks with a Chinese company that didn’t want to deal with it. All of the arguments—
there’s just no way in hell a jury will pay attention it. We had agreed on the price of the company. But then the buyer used
the lawsuit as leverage to get the price down on the order of $10 million due to the outstanding lawsuit– 20% of the value
of the company. They said this is [a] $20M liability which was bogus. But we didn’t have the money to settle it.”
-Laura Smith, Intellectual Property Manager
For full testimony, see Appendix B.

cheaper to settle than to fight. Once successful, you are
sued with typical $500,000 - 1,000,000 type settlement
even if the claim is completely worthless. Cost to defend
is $1,500,000 plus, so we settle,” said another.
But NPE demands were perceived to be triggered not
only by success, but also vulnerability. According to one
respondent: “the NPE saw the company had substantial
funding, but not enough funding or revenue… to mount
a prolonged legal defense. They saw we were vulnerable
and eager to settle to avoid distraction and cost.”
Sometimes the objective is to sue not because there are
funds, but because companies need funds: “publicity
that our company was raising money prompted a troll
to sue for patent infringement. They knew a company
ha[d] to buy them off if it is likely to raise new capital. No
investor wants to make a new investment in a company
charged with patent infringement. It’s a pretty common
strategy.” Having an outstanding patent lawsuit, even
when the company’s case is strong and the value of the
technology is low, can cause a company to be devalued
significantly, for example, by 20%.30
Whatever the specific motive, a number of NPE
assertions appear to be strategically timed in order
to obtain settlements. As the Managing Partner of
a technology-focused private equity fund said in an
interview, “NPEs have… become very adept at suing
at opportune times—right as the sale of a company is
announced for example—where parties are more likely
to settle so as not to jeopardize a good transaction.”
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Industry-Wide Campaigns
Another category of demands—“blanket suits”—include
a large number of targets. In a typical description, a
company is “sued by an NPE, along with everyone else
in their industry (biometrics).” Industry-wide suits may
be staged: one respondent described a strategy in which
his company was sued first, in order to “negotiate for
the biggest royalty percentage possible without regard
to the sales base to which the royalty was applied. They
then appeared to use the ‘percentage’ settlement in
negotiations with bigger competitors.”31 Industry-wide
campaigns may include only letters, or letters and suits.
References to “crazy insane broad patents” and “software
patents” were cited in connection with these larger
campaigns.

Customer or “End-User” Suits
The industry-wide campaigns that have generated the
most numbers of defendants, however, fit a distinct
profile—that the startup is being sued because of their
use or implementation of another’s technology, rather
than the startup’s own technology.32 According to an
analysis provided by PatentFreedom, which tracks
NPE litigations, all 10 of the top patent litigation
campaigns of the last three years, as measured by
number of defendants, named users or implementers of
a technology, and over 100 defendants.33
We asked startups who had received NPE demands to
identify the basis for the demands they received. Forty
New America Foundation

percent of the respondents (N=35) indicated that the
basis for the demand was the startup’s adoption of
another’s technology, a number that was consistent with
the 2012 survey. The technology varied, with survey
respondents reported being sued, for example, for their
use of “printer [features]” and “Google Play.”
Survey respondents also identified the liability startups
face as suppliers of technology. Because growing revenue
and customers is a critical milestone in a new company’s
development, startups are particularly sensitive to
disruptions to their customer relationships. As one
interviewee put it, “[NPEs] also have become adept at
going after the customers of software companies—they
threaten to sue your customers, who then pressure you
to settle.” A startup that might otherwise fight a demand
cannot do so when being pressed to pay the NPE by its
customers.
One prominent campaign, carried out by Lodsys, has
targeted manufacturers, ecommerce companies, game
developers, website-survey providers, owners of websites
with interactive chat, and mobile app developers for
implementing click-to-upgrade and in-app purchasing,
through Apple iOS and Android development kits
and APIs.34 Another campaign, Geotag, has sued an
estimated 544 defendants for having websites that
feature locator functionality and organize the results
geographically.35 This functionality does not appear
to be provided by a single provider (both Google and
Microsoft services, for example, have been implicated)
but instead implemented by web designers working for
the defendants and others.

The Open Technology Institute

The Impact of Customer Assertions on Small
Company Suppliers and Adopters of Technology
To understand the strategy behind and impact of
customer campaigns on startups in the marketplace, we
surveyed and interviewed outside and in-house counsel
and purchasers and customers of technology products.
Campaigns against customers have impacted startups
as customers and suppliers in distinct ways.
As users of others’ technology, startups are less likely
to be protected from customer suits. Small companies
are less likely to negotiate the indemnity terms of their
purchase or have the “buying power” of larger customers
to demand the protections of technology suppliers than
are larger companies, interviewees said.
As suppliers, startups face risks when their customers
are sued.36 Customer suits may be motivated by practical
obstacles to suing the supplier: either due to the way the
patent is written, or because the supplier is overseas.37
However, according to the lawyers we surveyed, the
motivation is more often strategic: for example, to
enlarge the base—“patentee [did] not sue… suppliers
because they have wanted the damages base to be the
$400/500 price of a phone rather than the $25 price of
a chip or the price (sometimes zero) of the software,”
to “maximize the number of defendants to maximize
the ‘return,’” or “because [trolls]… seek easy money
from defendants who have no idea how the technology
works,” said survey respondents.
Having a customer involved in the suit can change the
dynamic and make it harder to resist settlement. As one
venture capitalist said, “we got a nuisance suit from an NPE
13

who actually sued our clients and given the disruption to
our business we choose to settle rather than pay the expense
to fight… in the… [Eastern District of Texas]. Spending in
the millions to initially fight then settle reduced our hiring
and development of new products. …[W]ith expenses
already approaching $1 million and nervous customers
we had no choice [but to settle].”
The leverage of customers and the threat of suit can
harm the startup supplier, even if no suit is actually
filed. As a veteran litigator put it, “small companies
lose two ways. First, large customers force the suppliers
into indemnification agreements that impose uncapped
exposure on the supplier for a relatively small amount
of revenue. Second, large customers can force suppliers
to take over a defense and indemnification obligations
even if there is no obligation. The small supplier cannot
afford to upset their large customers. As a result, these
14

companies can face legal bills (regardless of merits)
that greatly exceed the revenue that they received from
selling product to the big customer.”
Even when the supplier covers its customer’s costs, the
incident may cause irreparable harm to the relationship:
according to one VC respondent, “[the NPE suit] cost
us standing with a large customer who had to deal with
the same situation. We had indemnified, but that wasn’t
good enough…[given] the lost time, lost confidence
and the uncertainty.” At the supplier selection stage,
the perception that a smaller company may not be
financially able to stand behind its product has also
impacted purchasing decisions—causing customers to
drop the technology38 or choose a larger supplier due
to doubts about the small supplier’s ability to indemnify
them in the event of loss. One interviewee, legal counsel
at a large bank, said, “If I have big company on one
New America Foundation

hand, and small company on the other hand—this is
real—we’ve gone with the bigger provider because the
indemnity would wipe… [the small company] out.”

sentiment was that “the biggest problem with patents is
in the software world, where many obvious things are
patented. This makes the whole system weaker.”

Low Quality Patents

Poor patent quality harms startups and small companies,
said respondents, when “[l]arge companies use their
arsenal of patents to file frivolous lawsuits,” “[d]eserving
patents get same timeline as undeserving ones,” and
“[obvious] [s]oftware patents hurt innovation and
destroy jobs,” in the words of respondents.

Many responses identified low patent quality, specifically
software and business methods patents, as problematic.
As one startup respondent put it,“[i]n the case of software
patents, not only is there significant prior art in a large
percentage of cases, but most software patents are not
novel: someone had a need to do something, and created
it. That’s how software works. These facts are not helpful
when faced with an NPE unless you have the resources
to wage a legal battle to bring the facts to light.” Even if
seemingly straightforward from a technical standpoint,
resolving a software patent demand was described
as “expensive from a legal standpoint.” A common
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But if the problem is that it is “[w]ay too easy to get a
patent,” what is the solution? A significant minority of
survey respondents mentioned abolishing software or
business method patents or shortening the software
patent life to reflect the innovation cycle. Several other
responses endorsed doing so if the “problem of frivolous
litigation” could not be resolved.
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But these proposals, which would dramatically change
the current patent system,39 had as many and, in some
cases, more detractors than supporters among surveytakers. For example, abolishing software patents was
strongly favored by about 13% of surveyed VCs but
disfavored by 38% of them (N=87). While opinions
were nearly evenly split on the question of whether to
shorten patent term, nearly 70% favored or strongly
favored limiting software to truly novel inventions (Fig.
2).

Finding 2. Although patent “troll” assertions
are perceived as motivated primarily by money,
respondents reported routinely experiencing
non-financial consequences including delays
in hiring, meeting milestones, and business
line pivots and exits.
In this survey, we directly asked venture capitalists and
startups to describe the impacts on their companies
when they received NPE assertions. We compared these
results with the findings of Chien 2012,40 which also asked
survey participants about NPE impacts (Fig. 3). The level
of agreement varied by the type of impact. However,
across them, a significant portion of respondents—close
to 50% in each group—reported at least one significant

operational impact from the assertions: a delay in hiring
or other milestone, change in product, business pivot,
exit, or loss of customers or revenue (Fig. 3).

Perception of Unbounded Risk
While starting and running a company carries many
different risks, patent demands compare unfavorably to
others, according to respondents. A typical sentiment
described dealing with a demand as a “very worrying,
stressful and soul destroying process.” Part of the problem
is that the exposure is not known to the parties up front.
One interviewee, an entrepreneur who has encountered
multiple demands from NPEs, said, “You feel like you
missed something. The risks feel unbounded. You could
lose the company. You just don’t know.” Said a founder,
“[p]atents are one of the most painful parts of running a
startup, and that’s saying something.”

Impacts Flow from Costs of Defense, Not Loss
on the Merits of a Patent Case
The impacts of patent assertion are often experienced
regardless of whether or not the startup ultimately
prevails on the merits. Patent law is hard, requiring
founders and others at a company that gets a demand
to spend time and energy finding counsel and getting

“[O]ne company that is not entirely out of business, but is a tiny shell of its former self as a resultof being subjected to
two patent suits in rapid succession by two different entities, neither of which would fit the definition of an NPE or a PAE.
Both were failed entrants. Both were failed start-ups. The company was in the business of providing advertising services
to major brands. The first suit that we were hit with was from a company that was not in the business of advertising
services at all. It was a business-to-business company that was providing software, not services, to a completely different
industry—law enforcement. There’s no way we could have searched for that patent.
“The second suit we were hit with also was so completely different than what we were doing. That hurt when they sued
us. But it didn’t have a huge effect. They hadn’t gotten an injunction.
“But then they went on to sue our customers. So these are people like American Express and American Airlines, and
General Motors. The company in question employed 70 people. We were doing about $10 million in annual revenue, and
when they sued our customers, this was a nice to have, not a need to have, it was a marketing program for the customers.
The suits cut our revenue in half in three months. And so we couldn’t sustain the 70 people that we had on the payroll,
and so we had to cut the company in half.”
-Brad Burnham, Union Square Ventures
For full testimony, see Appendix B.
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up to speed on the complex, technical, and intricate set
of procedures and options available at the patent office
and in patent courts. Considerable engineer time is
required, for example, to file for patents and conduct
depositions. Patent law is also expensive. According
to one account, the company knew “within 24 hours
of being sued” that it was not infringing. However, it
incurred $3M in litigation expenses before the suit was
dismissed.41 Based on disclosures the company made
during litigation, the patentee filed for and got new
claims issued that it used to sue the company again. Even
though it had won the first suit, the company decided to
settle the claim rather than endure another lawsuit, by
paying the NPE “in the low seven figures.” The company
was acquired in the interim, and the acquirer reduced
the value of the company by 20% due to the suit.42

Impacts on Customer Relations, Transactions,
and Operations
As described earlier, customer relations present
The Open Technology Institute

particular vulnerabilities for small companies, as do
times of fundraising or acquisition. With respect to the
latter, several interviewees and respondents described
the friction in the market that the heightened risk
of patent lawsuits has created. In the words of one
interviewee:
[B]ecause acquisitions often trigger IP lawsuits
from trolls (e.g., Oracle buys company X, so trolls
immediately sue Oracle who has lots of money,
claiming that company X’s product infringes
on their patent), acquirers are now putting huge
indemnifications in the deals, up to the size of
the whole deal in several cases we have seen. That
means that the full value of the deal paid to the
shareholders of Company X may have to be paid
back if Oracle gets sued.
Or as another respondent put it, the motive of a suit may be
that the “[p]atent troll [is] seeking to steal escrow money
post acquisition of [a] portfolio company,” seeming to
suggest that the availability of the escrow money makes
an acquired company more vulnerable to attack.
17

Even when these conditions are not present, the demands
of a patent lawsuit have the potential to fundamentally
alter a company’s trajectory. As an interviewee noted,
“one of the companies we are invested in was sued by a
NPE. The company employs 170 people, many in high
paid manufacturing jobs. The company develops and
sells novel therapeutic medical devices to treat patients
in pain. The suit by the NPE will result in the company
changing its hiring and commercialization plans to
deal with the suit,” or worse “[the current suit] may put
company out of business. Litigation is too expensive for
such a small company.”
“Imagine you’re a small startup business. You have
three employees, including yourself, and you make
about $500K per year in revenue. You get a patent
infringement letter and are referred to some patent
attorney who tells you they charge $500 an hour and
will take at least 40 to 60 hours to review the matter.
Then, if you want this attorney to respond to the patent
holder, that’s another 20 hours to write letters, do
conference calls, etc. Before you know it, you’ve spent
$50K and had to lay off one of your employees. All this
time the patent holder is offering to settle for $20 to
40K. What are you going to do?”
-Dan Ravicher, Executive Director of Public

Patent Foundation

For full testimony, see Appendix B.

Finding 3. According to survey responses, most
VCs, particularly from pharma, biotech, and
medical device industries, believe patents to
be important to innovation and an estimated
5% of startups have sold their patents to NPEs,
experiencing positive benefits from doing so.
However, most VC respondents, including
the small number whose companies have sold
to NPEs, believe that NPEs are harmful for
innovation.
The Positive Impacts of NPEs for Some Startups
The perceived negative impacts of patent assertions
cannot be viewed in isolation from their potentially
18

positive impacts. Trolls can benefit startups by providing
a path to liquidity and enabling further investment and
innovation. As litigation becomes more expensive, this
path has become increasingly challenging. As one of
VC survey respondents described, “patent enforcement
has become financially undoable for small startup
companies. NPEs provide an avenue to protect assets
that would otherwise be lost due to financial constraints.”
While positive media accounts are relatively rare, it does
not mean that NPEs do not produce any benefits.
Based on survey responses, an estimated 5% of startups
are monetizing their patents. Sales can have significant
positive impacts for companies that sell as the cash
infusion brings more resources into the company.44 A
handful of VC respondents and company respondents
provided information about how the proceeds of patent
monetization were shared with them. According to the
10 responses, 60% were compensated through a lumpsum payment, and the remainder received a share of
the proceeds ranging from 10% to 67%, sometimes in
combination with an upfront payment.
This money can be used to create significant value
for the startup. According to VC responses, startup
patent monetizers using the money acquired through
NPEs have been able to fund a business pivot (37%),
pay for new hiring (20%), and help the company meet
milestones (17%). (N=30) As one VC respondent said,
the “company would have died without it—instead
we grew.” One startup founder described the benefit
as enabling the company to protect against theft by
competitors: “NPEs allow us to take on infringers who
steal our work.” If a company initiates a patent lawsuit, it
risks a countersuit and harm to its reputation. However,
by selling the patent to an NPE, the company can reap
the benefits without the risk. Because the NPE does not
make products, it is invulnerable to countersuit and
other potential consequences of initiating suit.
Given the positive impacts associated with patent
monetization, why aren’t more companies doing it?
Those who didn’t sell as well as those who did provided
New America Foundation

some answers. A number of respondents cited moral
opposition to patenting and patent assertion: “workforce
philosophically opposed [to patents],” “that’s against our
business ethic,” “most startups are not eager to work
with patent trolls.” Others saw NPE monetization as a
last resort: it was a “last ditch measure of desperation”
or done as part of “liquidation”; one VC interviewee
said that a seller, from a company in his portfolio, later
“regretted it.”45
Some respondents stressed that the NPE and startup
business model were at cross-purposes: “we are in
the business of developing products not monetizing
patents.” “[s]tartups are about execution;” “[w]e make
money solving real world problems.” “I believe in
competition” was one startup executive’s answer to the
question “[i]f your company doesn’t have patents, please
indicate why.” But practical obstacles also exist: startups
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have new patents, but NPEs disproportionately assert
old patents that cover mature existing technologies.46
Many startups do not have patents, due to the cost and
long gestation, relative to product lifecycles47 although
VC respondents to this survey reported a high level of
patenting among their companies (70%).48 Growing,
successful young companies often need their patents for
defensive and signaling purposes and can’t afford to sell
them to a NPE, or can not afford the time or distraction
from the main business to engage in licensing campaigns.

VC Opinions about the Impacts of Patents and
Patent Assertion on Innovation
The focus of policy discussions should be the social
calculus of patent assertion. According to some
estimates, the private and social costs of dealing with
NPE demands are in the tens of billions of dollars per
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“One suit hit the company at a very vulnerable time and almost put it out of business. The company learned a lot from
these experiences and turned around and started licensing to NPEs. The first time they did it, they needed the money.
“But then—this is going to sound like prostitution—they realized this was an opportunity to bring more resources into
the company... Since the first sale, they have periodically looked at their portfolio, and sold groups of patents to different
litigation entities. Another lawsuit the company had was actually from a NPE that acquired a patent from another one of
our portfolio companies. I learned this while in the due diligence process while investing in the company that sold. The
person who sold that patent recently told me he regrets selling it, and the company has made a point of not pursuing
any additional patent licensing.
“Net-net, I wish we had never been on either offense or defense. I think the company would have been better off had
it never been sued for infringement and never sold patents. In fact, the benefit of selling patents—their own use of the
system—didn’t offset the pain of the lawsuits.”
-Don Ellson, Private Equity Investor
For full testimony, see Appendix B.

year,50 based on extrapolating from survey data, though
the representativeness of the data points of those costs
which should properly be classified as transfers to
innovators is unknown.51 If most of the money from
patent assertion is going from large companies to small
innovative ones, even with a high transaction cost,
society might benefit through enhanced competition.
VCs are well-poised to understand these flows as both
sources and users of technology. To understand how VCs
viewed the impacts of patent assertion on innovation,
we provided a separate module to about 73 VC surveytakers (about half of the surveyed population) who
invest in a variety of technology companies spanning
biotech to app development. The survey asked how
much survey-takers agreed or disagreed with three
assertions (Fig. 4):
1. The ability of my companies to enforce or
monetize their patents through NPEs/“trolls”
helps innovation.
2. Patents are vital for innovation in my industry.
3. The ability of my companies to enforce or
monetize their patents through NPEs/”trolls”
helps innovation.

The Positive Role of Patents
Out of 41 respondents, 71% agreed or strongly agreed
that patents were vital for innovation in their industry
(Fig. 4). While the number of total respondents was too
few to break into industry cohorts, many of the positive
comments came from the biotech, pharma, and medical
device industries. Survey respondents reported, for
example, that patents were “critical for raising money
for product development,” and “crucial for protecting
the expensive innovations and product development
investments that must be made to bring a novel effective
product through the regulatory process.” One investor
described how “the company achieved a significant
increase in acquisition price as a result of their patent
portfolio.” Another VC commented that patents were a
necessity, enabling investment: “[it is] impossible to get
financing without a good patent strategy, freedom to
operate and good prospects of patentability.”
Answers to a related question may partially explain
the response: VCs reported that their companies were
engaged with the patent system in multiple ways,
through patent filings,52 licensing in the patents of
others to access technology,53 and licensing out of their
own patents to transfer technology.54
While most surveyed VCs were positive about patents,
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startup survey respondents55 tended to express more
anti-patent sentiments, e.g. “abolish software patents”
or “business method patents should not be allowed.” Yet
even among VCs who valued patents, their impressions
of the patent system were negatively colored by their
NPE experiences:
I am pro-patent, very pro-patent… because I think
in the long-run it helps with innovation in the
industry. I think people who innovate deserve to
be rewarded. However, if the alternative is having
a bunch of NPEs running around increasing the
cost of doing business through frivolous lawsuits
then I think this country would be better off
abolishing software patents.

The Negative Role of Patent Assertion Entities
A mixed view was shared by many VC respondents;
a majority of responders viewed patents favorably,
but patent assertion negatively: 78% of respondents
disagreed strongly that the ability of companies to
monetize their patents through NPEs/“trolls” helped
innovation, and 83% agreed or agreed strongly that
NPEs/“trolls” were hurting innovation (Fig. 4).
While a number of remarks expressed only negative
sentiments about NPEs,56 a number of them openly
addressed the difference between patents helping
companies defensively and NPEs asserting them
offensively:
Patents are important… Having a decent portfolio
allows our companies to build ‘stakes’ around
their solution and make it more difficult for a
competitor to replicate the solution without
significant work. Trolls, being NPEs are using
patents only to monetize, but not create any value
as our companies are, so I do see them as being
misaligned with how our companies use patents
as a defensive (rather than offensive) measure in
most cases.
The sense that NPEs did not “fight fair” or contribute
to society, even though patents were valuable, pervaded
related answers to the question, “Please describe
any experiences that you would like to share with
The Open Technology Institute

lawmakers regarding the positive or negative impact of
patents/patent enforcement on your investments and
your companies. How have patents helped or harmed
transacting and innovation in your industry?”
NPEs negatively colored otherwise positive views of
patents. As one respondent relayed: “patents held by
legitimate product companies are important to support
investment and innovation. NPE’s activities should be
severely limited - they are not net contributors to society
and their contribution to exits is not significant.” In the
view of another, an investor in advanced manufacturing
and industrial technologies who indicated that his
portfolio companies had sold patents to NPEs:
All of our portfolio companies file patents; have had
patents issued and are continuing to innovate and
consult with their IP Committees about ongoing
filing of novel ideas/products. We have been the
defendants in three lawsuits by… patent trolls. One
of the three… cost our company greatly in the cost
of capital—the suit was filed in the midst of a capital
raise—as well as the cost to settle the case.
One VC respondent weighed the pros and cons this way:
[P]atents slightly help: increas[ing] chances
investors will back your company (‘you have
something unique and protectable’). But mostly
investors don’t care because it is hard for startups to
enforce patents, and there are usually ways to work
around them. [They] often hurt: the patents out
there represent a mine-field for a small company.
[It is] expensive to know that you are in the clear,
[and there is a] chance of highway robbery by NPEs.
Net-net, they are probably a negative these days.

The Views of Those Who Have Benefited From
and Been Harmed by NPEs
Those who have sold their patents have more direct
experience with the positive impacts of those sales. A
small number of the VCs (N=12) who provided their
views on innovation also indicated that their companies
had monetized their patents. Despite their likely
familiarity with the positive impacts of assertions, these
VCs had highly negative views of patent “trolls”: 83%
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strongly disagreed that “the ability of my companies to
enforce or monetize their patents through NPEs/‘trolls’
helps innovation”; 67% agreed or strongly agreed that
patents were vital for innovation and 58% strongly
agreed that NPEs hurt innovation.

NPEs have no positive impact on innovation. Real
innovators don’t work long years in order to sell
out to an NPE. They are motivated by the hope that
they can build an operating business and change
the world. NPEs come along like a loan shark after
a mass layoff and buy broken dreams for cheap.

This surprising outcome may be explained by the
likelihood that, based on responses, portfolios of
surveyed VCs whose companies had monetized through
NPEs (5%) likely also included companies that had
received demands by NPEs (20% of companies). How
did VCs whose companies had both sold patents to
NPEs and been sued by NPEs trade off the advantages
or disadvantages?

Finding 4. Startup concerns with patent
enforcement go beyond NPEs and extend to the
disadvantages relative to larger incumbents that
startups experience as a result of poor patent
quality, high costs, and delays associated with
the patent system. The inability of startups to
defend their own patents, and suits brought by
“patent predators,” larger companies that sue
with anti-competitive motives, also presented
specific concerns.

Several venture capitalists described cross-portfolio
attacks in which companies in their portfolio had
actually been sued on the basis of a patent that another
company in their portfolio had previously sold. In one
case, the patents were sold when the first portfolio
company needed cash. Later the patents resurfaced in
a NPE lawsuit against a second portfolio company. The
company that had sold also was sued multiple times by
NPEs, leading the venture capitalist to conclude: “The
benefit of selling patents—their own use of the system—
didn’t offset the pain of the lawsuits, particularly when
they came… I’d rather there be no patents than the
current system.”57
In the case of another investor, a patent was sold in
the company firesale. It eventually found its way into
the hands of, not an NPE, but a large incumbent who
turned around and asserted it against the investor’s new
portfolio: “IP that was partially funded by our firm was
used to sue other portfolio companies… and it is one
of the many reasons why I have come to believe that
software and business method patents are an enemy of
innovation.”58
A more cynical account was provided by another VC
whose companies had sold to NPEs as well as been
targeted by them:
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Although the focus of this report is on patent assertions
by NPEs, a number of questions on the survey addressed
other topics about the patent system, including patent
litigation against competitors, the relative position of
large and small companies in the patent system, and the
administration of the patent system. Previous work has
found that delayed venture capital funding characterizes
software sectors where incumbents hold large numbers
of patents.59 Among answers to this survey there was a
common theme: that small companies are disadvantaged
by the costs and delays associated with the patent system
because the patent “game” is one that is “too slow” and
“too expensive to play for small companies.”
Survey respondents described what they felt were
disadvantages for small companies across the patent
system: in prosecution, “big companies can file huge
volume of patents [and] need to have a higher hurdle for
patentability;” on the defense, “[t]he power of companies
with a lot of assets to sue and harass smaller companies
for whom fighting is financially difficult is unfairly
detrimental to innovation and new businesses;” and on
the offense, when “[l]arge companies largely tell their
executives to build whatever product that the markets
needs and not to worry about smaller companies’ patents
because they will be able to outlast them in court.”
New America Foundation

Across these contexts and comments, VC and company
respondents consistently expressed the general
sentiment that “[a large company] can outlast and
outspend a smaller company.”

those same competitors freely copy it and say that what
we did was obvious. Defending our patents takes years
and is very expensive. When we finally win they will
claim that competition is good for the US economy.”

Missing the Forest for the Trolls60

Advantages, Tactics, and Motivations of
Incumbents in Patent Offense

A number of VCs expressed the sense that the patent
advantages of incumbents were as great, if not greater,
a problem for startups than patent “trolls.” According to
one respondent:
IP is not black/white and you cannot simply group
us into companies who pursue patents and those
who do not. Small companies who file a small
number of patents are still outgunned by the bigger
corps who can file (or buy/license) more patents
and have deeper pockets with which to fight
battles. This goes beyond the equally important
problem with NPEs…
Others went further, viewing NPEs as a distraction from
the real problem of large companies misusing their power:
Patents are critical for innovation in small
companies and small companies are critical for
job creation in our country. We should be much
more worried about big companies misusing the
patent system against small companies rather than
fretting about patent trolls using the patent system
against big companies. The big company lobby
is the consistent ‘winner’ in this battle and it is
hurting our country.

Advantages of Incumbents in Patent Defense
Survey respondents described abuses by large
companies in both resisting and bringing demands. In
the words of one VC, “[b]ig companies don’t take small
companies seriously because they know we don’t have
the resources to start infringement litigation.” A number
of comments referred to not just ignorance but theft by
larger companies, enabled by a slow and cumbersome
patent administration system: “I have one company
now that developed technology which was described as
impossible by large competitors. We have issued patents
but now that this technology is winning in the market,
The Open Technology Institute

A large number of comments also addressed the offensive
advantages of large companies when they sue small
companies, also known as patent predation61 or patent
bullying,62 and their apparently anti-competitive motives.
In response to the question, “what triggered the suit/
demand,”63 a few VCs responded that the suit was an
overture to an acquisition or licensing (“[p]atentee’s
strategy was to force a merger (competitor)”; “in some
cases, work out a licensing agreement”) or to interfere
with the startup’s operations (“[b]ig company scorched
earth tactics … scare a smaller company and make it
hard to raise funding”). In extreme cases, to sue a
company out of existence appeared to be the object
of the suit, according to VC respondents: “drain the
start-up of cash to remove a competitor”; “to squash
a thinly funded competitor”; “competitor’s desire to
shut company down.” The posture of cases was not
necessarily offensive, however, as VCs also cited the
defensive concerns of incumbents fearful of the startup’s
success when asked what triggered the suit or demand:
to “thwart company’s market share growth or stall
market traction of new technology,” “competitor does
not have this technology but much larger and deeper
pockets”; “emerging threat of startup to incumbents”;
“[c]ompetitor usually gets scared and usually has no
real claim but tries to tie small company up. Competitor
is usually very large public corp.” Company respondents
put it more plainly: “[c]ompetitor is losing and is
resorting to spurious business method patents”; “[there]
was no basis for [the competitor suit], but their company
was going bankrupt so it was probably desperation.”
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“Competitor” v. “NPE”
In many of these cases, the distinction between a large
company competitor and “troll” was unclear—“the
difference between NPE and competitor is gray. The
competitors were at one point trying to launch a product
but clearly never acquired the resources to do so. So they
effectively became NPEs” said one VC. Another VC and
his portfolio company discussed in survey responses
and follow up correspondence that:
[S]ome operating companies are ‘sham companies’
that acquire defunct or non-functioning
companies for cents on the dollar and uses those
patents to attack large and small companies alike
or sell a minimal amount to establish some shred
of legitimacy. They go after start-up companies to
establish case precedent.
While labels were unhelpful to these commenters, what
did seem to matter was whether not the company was
actually developing or selling a product. Was the patent
being “used” appeared to be the yardstick, though this
is not a requirement of patent ownership or assertion:
“[p]atents that are legitimate serve a useful purpose
when owned and used by an operating company. A

company should only be able to prosecute a patent if
it has a commercial product that relies on that patent
or is in active development of one,” said one VC
survey respondent. Another agreed: “[p]atents held by
legitimate product companies are important to support
investment and innovation. NPEs activities should
be severely limited—they are not net contributors to
society and their contribution to exits is not significant.”
This distinction is translated into attitudes about the
ultimate social value of patent lawsuits. In one VC’s
opinion, “[i]ts very clear that competitor demands
are positive and sharpen the company strategy,
troll demands are much more detrimental - pure
extortion.” But others thought competitor cases were
more challenging: “corporate enforcement actions
are often more complex and demanding than NPE’s
because corporate actions are motivated by more than
monetization, and often emotion drives litigation
decisions. NPEs rarely have these issues.” But according
to another, “[w]ith competitors you have a business
discussion. With an NPE, you are speaking with
federally-endorsed organized crime.”

“We were planning to raise a Series A round during the summer of 2013 but before we could, we were sued for patent
infringement by our biggest competitor, Wellpoint, who owns 1-800-Contacts and Glasses.com. Just like that, we were
faced with an ‘injunction’ threat from a $25B competitor. I was terrified our years of hard work were for naught.
“As it turns out, after seeing our technology, Wellpoint launched its own offering and immediately bought a patent which
they are now using to sue us. It took me some time to come to grips with that fact that a $25B healthcare company who
carefully crafts the image of being compassionate and caring towards the consumer would go on the aggressive against
a 13-person startup. I can only speculate that they fear that the patents we filed (which take years to issue!) will become a
weapon towards them down the road. But if they would have just called me before filing a lawsuit against us, they would
know we applied for those patents for defensive purposes, not offensive ones. I care more about building a superior
customer experience than I do about going after them with patents.”
-Kate Endress, Founder and CEO of DITTO.com
For full testimony, see Appendix B.
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Proposals and Observations

The second part of this report describes existing and potential legislative, judicial, and marketbased responses to patent assertions and how they may be tailored to better meet the needs of startups
and resource-poor defendants. According to survey responses, patents for novel inventions appear to
be playing a generally positive and at times crucial role for startups, helping to transfer technology, enable investment, and improve exits, particularly in life sciences industries. But patent assertions at times
hit startups when they are least able to fight them—on the eve of a funding or acquisition event, or,
40% of the time, in the context of its customer relations—and can have significant and at times devastating impacts on the company. Furthermore, many survey respondents don’t find these to be socially
productive assertions—but rather involving frivolous or overbroad patents, and frustrating rather than
furthering competition.
Among the surveyed VCs, NPE experiences were both common, with nearly 90% of tech VCs
reporting experience with NPE assertions, and also highly concerning: two-thirds of VC respondents
strongly agreed with the assertion that NPEs/”trolls” were harming innovation in their industry, a sentiment shared even by those who monetized their patents. Though “the risk [associated with patents]
feels unbounded,” startups are routinely expected to absorb these risks in their dealings with acquirers,
investors, and customers. As detailed in the comments and testimony, NPE assertions have added friction to technology transactions, reduced the value of pursued startups, and triggered large indemnities
among the surveyed population.
Taken together, these responses make a strong case for patent reforms, but reforms that will
work for startups and small companies and their distinct needs and vulnerabilities. Startups, with their
fewer resources, less time, and greater focus on building the business, are at a relative disadvantage
when patent processes are expensive, slow, and require deep patent expertise. These disadvantages
make startups vulnerable to patent “bullies”—incumbents who are threatened by the success of upstarts, as well as “trolls” who bring patent nuisance claims.
The Open Technology Institute
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These findings have implications both for public actors
who seek to improve the patent system and private
actors who seek to reduce the business risks that patent
assertions pose. The ideas discussed below reinforce
existing and proposed efforts and suggest others for
improving our patent system. To the extent possible, the
recommendations leverage existing laws, programs, and
initiatives, making them more tailored to the needs of
startups and small companies, rather than creating new
private causes of action, new regulatory infrastructure,
or onerous compliance burdens for the PTO or courts.

PUBLIC SECTOR PROPOSALS
Recommendation 1: “Make patents on software
only for truly innovative things.”
How: Fully fund the PTO and its quality initiatives
including tightening functional claiming and expand
low-cost access to the PTO’s transitional program and
other forms of post-grant review by reducing fees for
small and micro entities and supporting and prioritizing
collaborative challenges to patents asserted against large
numbers of defendants, particularly by downstream
users and small entities.
Overbroad and low-quality patents are responsible
for a disproportionate amount of the discontent
in the patent system, according to VC and startup
respondents. To address the perception that bad patents
are creating unmanageable patent risk, lawmakers and
administrators should:

1. Fully fund, adequately staff, and support the
PTO in current and future initiatives to increase
patent quality.
The earlier its lifecycle that a low-quality patent can
be weeded out, the less it will cost to society. Thus, the
PTO must be empowered to act as a true gatekeeper
and guardian of the public by preventing the patenting
of non-novel inventions. Assuming that this will require
a change to how the PTO is currently doing business,
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however, support will be needed on several fronts.
First, the PTO must be fully funded, adequately staffed,
and supported in its current and future patent quality
initiatives. These programs include training, guideline
development, prior art partnerships for example with
Stack Exchange, its Software Patent partnership, and
basic infrastructure improvements. Because of their
high social return on investment, these sorts of initiatives
should be prioritized. Second, and crucially, institutional
pressures must not undermine improvement of patent
quality. Examiners who reject large numbers of patent
applications should not be penalized for doing so.64 The
PTO must be able to rigorously apply the law without
jeopardizing its financial outlook. A more gradual
process of ratcheting up the standards for granting a
patent would give patentees and prosecutors the ability
to write higher quality patent applications of narrower
and more defined scope. The PTO should focus on
quality levers like obviousness, functional claiming,65
and the other disclosure doctrines, and apply them
rigorously, transparently, and consistently.
As the PTO executes, for example, on President
Obama’s mandate to provide new training to examiners
on functional claiming and provide claim clarity,66 it
should have support to do what is necessary to apply the
law, including educating patent prosecutors, phasing in
guidelines, and adjusting count and incentive systems.67
The PTO should engage the public through its Software
Partnership and make it easy to track its progress and
get involved at a patent level.

2. Increase low-cost access to the PTO’s
administrative review processes, including by
giving special priority to “high-impact” patents
that have been asserted against a large number
of targets.
Improvements in patent quality need to translate into
reduced risk and cost, which can be in the millions when
startups defend a case.68 Thus, although improving the
quality of patent applications is important, already
New America Foundation

“[O]ne of the most critical problems is the issuance of so many invalid patents by the Patent Office. The PTO makes
ten times as much money from granting patents as it does from denying patents, and examiners have a much easier
time making their quota by granting patents, because no one objects, than from rejecting a patent and defending that
rejection repeatedly. Until the incentives placed on the office and its employees to grant, rather than deny, patents
are addressed, there will be too many invalid patents issued that can be strategically used by their holders to extract
undeserved settlements from others.”
-Dan Ravicher, Executive Director of Public Patent Foundation
For full testimony, see Appendix B.

issued patents are an equally urgent target of patent
quality initiatives.

existing patents on the basis of overbroad functional
claiming (Section 112) and related grounds of invalidity.

The America Invents Act has created promising
mechanisms for challenging questionable patents, but
there are limits to their usefulness for startups and small
companies. The inter partes review (IPR) and the covered
business method (CBM) review mechanisms are being
used to a much greater extent than previous forms of
post grant review.69 The initiation of such reviews can be
effective for slowing patent demands. For example, in the
case of the scanner patent assertion entity MPHJ, the entity
quieted its campaign following a licensing agreement and
the initiation of two inter partes reviews on its patents.

Low-cost access to administrative review of a patent
should be expanded. Small and micro entity fee tiers
should be available, and the PTO should support
collaborative challenges to empower multiple small
parties to take advantage of administrative review. The
courts should prioritize those reviews to ensure that they
translate into lower costs through stays or limitations on
willfulness.

However, two features significantly limit the usefulness
of these mechanisms for startups and small companies:
cost and scope of review. First, IPR and CBM are
expensive and increase upfront costs—estimates of
IPR costs range from $200-300K and CBMs have
been priced at $350K. For example, to file an inter
partes review (IPR) typically requires, according to
a seasoned litigator, “a prior art search, detailed filing
(akin to a summary judgment brief), and, typically, an
accompanying expert declaration… The large upfront
cost (e.g., $75,000) discourages small companies from
filing an IPR [which] is more expensive in the short
term.” These costs will not be offset if any accompanying
litigation is not stayed.70 Second, not all procedures are
available for all patents on all grounds. For example, the
CBM program is limited to business method patents.
However, CBM is currently the only post-grant review
mechanism that allows challenges to be brought to
The Open Technology Institute

The PTO could also be given authority to prioritize
reviews on the basis of public interest, in the same way
that it prioritizes the review of patent applications that,
for example, cover energy conservation or counterterrorism inventions.71 In the case of patent challenges,
special treatment could be reserved for patents that
are “high impact” because they are asserted, through
letters or suit, against a large number of entities or more
(e.g. 20 though the right number should be empirically
derived), or because they are asserted against a certain
number of small entities that have, for example, fewer
than 500 employees or nonprofit status. This would
likely encompass “en masse” campaigns that have
been asserted against large numbers of customers72 or
campaigns that otherwise “blanket the industry.” Such
treatment would recognize that not all patent campaigns
are created equal. When a dispute impacts a large number
of members of the public, or disproportionately impacts
small entities, the social returns from clarification of the
claim scope and patent’s validity are high.
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These gains would be realized whether the patent is
confirmed, invalidated, or clarified. Rather than fighting
over the patent’s validity in court, the parties could
move on and settle the case or focus the dispute. For
these types of patents, all grounds of review could be
available, and review could be provided on an expedited
basis upon petition, as that review arguably impacts
more people than an ordinary review. The PTO could
also accept “petitions to review” from members of the
public and initiate its own post-grant review if it feels
like the public interest would be served.
In addition, the PTO should continue its excellent job
thus far of bolstering confidence that its reviews are
being handled in a timely manner. It should make the
status of administrative proceedings transparent and
accessible so a court feels confident that when it stays
a case and waits for the PTO’s review, it will not be
delaying justice indefinitely. The PTO should publish
target dates for the completion of its proceedings, as
does the International Trade Commission (ITC), whose
“investigations” proceed in parallel with district court
cases.

Recommendation 2: Make patent cases about
merits, not about who can “play the patent game
better…[or] outlast or outspend.”
How: Permit more discretion in awarding fees and costs
for non-core discovery and promoting uniformity and
early dispositive rulings, for example by requiring the
Patent Pilot Program to implement and measure the
impact of best practices.
If it is the case that “[e]xpensive, bureaucratic systems
always favor those with deep pockets”, three steps can
reduce the costs and risks for small company patent
plaintiffs and defendants.

1. Promote fee-shifting and discovery costshifting.
A number of comments reflect the perception that
plaintiffs bring weak patent cases in part because they
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will not be penalized for doing so: “the legal costs to
running a business are significant. There is no penalty
for suing a company even if the claims are completely
fraudulent. Therefore, there is nothing to lose from
suing any company that you think has money.”
Fee-shifting would change this dynamic when the party
with fewer resources has the stronger case: “[we] got a
nuisance suit…we chose to settle rather than pay the
expense to fight. [I]f we knew we’d get our expenses
back if we won the suit, we would have continued”;
“[e]ven if clearly not infringing, small companies
(start-ups) are wasting time and capital defending or
settling frivolous suits due to the way our legal system
works (both sides pay for legal fees, so [it’s] cheaper to
settle than fight even if you know you’ll likely win).”
Commented one founder and CEO who tried to raise
money from investors to ward off a patent suit, “the fact
that fees are often sunk costs (no fee-shifting in place
yet) also made it harder to raise money for this.”73 As
discussed earlier, fee-shifting could also encourage
small companies, despite their shallower pockets,
to bring strong cases against larger competitors by
penalizing the large company for resisting a meritorious
demand. Fee-shifting is not a panacea, however—it
has been the norm for centuries in other settings but
its ability to deter frivolous litigation has not been
well-documented.74 In the context of patent litigation,
indeterminacy in patent determinations and appeals, as
well as the ability of parties to evade judgment without a
bond requirement, present real obstacles to the recovery
process. Still, two-way fee-shifting will increase the
penalty for asserting weak claims, as well as the penalty
for resisting meritorious claims, and empower those
with strong cases to pursue them.
Courts should use existing and any expanded discretion
they are given to shift fees in order to discourage wasteful
litigation and litigation practices. Congress should
also enable courts to shift fees prior to the resolution
of a case as few small companies have the ability to “go
all the way” in litigation. Requiring parties to pay for
discovery beyond core documents, as has been proposed
New America Foundation

“Right after this case, the judge changed his practice. Now he issues claim construction on the day of the ruling. That
would have saved us a lot of pain.
“This should be a requirement, that you get it done right then. You’ll never have a better understanding of the case than
on that day. The longer you wait, the more unfamiliar the material becomes. Even if we had lost, we would have written
the check and settled, rather than spending another $1.5M on discovery.”
-Laura Smith, Intellectual Property Manager
For full testimony, see Appendix B.

by a number of Congressional bills, would reduce the
staggering costs and inefficiencies that can accompany
conventional patent litigation.

2. Promote Greater Uniformity Across Patent
Courts.
Another recurring theme among the comments was
the problem of game-playing, particularly through
venue-shopping. Commenters specifically called out
particular venues. In one example, a VC respondent
described his companies as being sued by three patent
“trolls,” including one “filed in [the] Eastern District of
Texas with Judge Ward [that] cost our company greatly
in the cost of capital [and settlement]—a seven figure
amount. The settlement was only agreed to once Judge
Ward agreed to a change of venue to a court in Ohio.
This whole ‘gaming strategy’ deployed by these trolls is
quite disruptive and costly to early stage companies. I
am a big supporter of restricting the unbridled activities
of these patent trolls.” A number of others talked about
the additional costs of being sued in venues that were
inconvenient to them.75
Wide variations in how courts managed patent cases
were also described in companion surveys of over
500 in-house and outside patent counsel.76 “I still see
a huge disparity among the courts’ e-discovery rules
and standards,” said one plaintiff ’s attorney. Asked to
comment on the effectiveness of various interventions
to increase the efficiency of patent litigation, another
replied “ALL of the above depend on the judge.”
While discretion is a keystone of our judicial system,
The Open Technology Institute

Congress should promote greater uniformity across
patent courts. This could take place in multiple ways, for
example, by Congress mandating specific practices or
principles, or by promoting uniform case management
practices across initiatives like the Patent Pilot Program,
with outcomes measured through different metrics such
as cost or time to resolution as a proportion of case
value, and party satisfaction. This would anchor the
Patent Pilot Program with a deliverable that could be
used as the basis for further policymaking.

3. Promote Early Rulings on Dispositive Issues.
In the words of one VC survey respondent, patent
litigation is a “war of attrition” that favors those with
deeper pockets, more time, and greater expertise. These
advantages can be undercut, and considerable savings
captured, by focusing issues and promoting early rulings
on “dispositive” issues, ones whose resolution would
resolve the entire case. As one example of a dispositive
issue, if a court ruled that a patent was invalid on any
ground, it would moot—or dispose of—the entire case.
If a court ruled that a patent should be interpreted in
a particular way, the case could continue, making it a
non-dispositive issue.
Among over 500 surveyed inside and outside counsel,
the highest rated intervention to enhance the efficiency
of patent litigation—over fee-shifting, over discovery
reform, and over a host of legislative and judicial
interventions—was a timely decision on summary
judgment (SJ) motions, which provide a judgment for
a party to litigation without a full trial. 75% of outside
and inside counsel survey takers rated them as “very
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“Our clients don’t have the financial ability to hire any patent attorneys to represent them, so proposals that merely
create more legal mechanisms for challenging patents or deterring them through litigation won’t be of any help. Rather,
my clients need a system that provides pro bono legal counsel or shelter from such risks, either through an exemption
or immunity under patent law, or informally through some private risk sharing arrangement like insurance. Individuals,
non-profits, and small businesses don’t have the money, or the time, to get involved in protracted patent litigation, so
proposals like fee-shifting won’t help, because they will never get there.”
-Dan Ravicher, Executive Director of Public Patent Foundation
For full testimony, see Appendix B.

effective” at increasing efficiency, far more than any
other intervention.
For example, the Lodsys involves app developers who
have implemented functionality provided by the iOS
App Developer Toolkit. Stepping in on behalf of its
implementers, Apple asserted an exhaustion defense
that would shield them from liability. Deciding this
issue early could dismiss scores of demands and
litigants from the challenge or, if decided against Apple,
encourage it to sign an additional license with Lodsys to
cover its implementers. Other dispositive motions such
as standing present low risk, high reward propositions
for the court. If the motion is successful, the case goes
away. If it is denied, a source of uncertainty is removed
for the parties and settling becomes easier. To avoid
waste, it makes sense to know whether or not the cases
actually pass these basic screens. In cases where a large
number of defendants are named, in particular customer
or implementer suits, where common questions of fact
provide the basis for liability, the savings potential is
large.
The ITC’s recent innovation of ordering early
dispositive motions within the first 100-days of a case
is a great example of how such prioritization may align
the parties’ and courts’ interests.77 By setting aside a
period of time to hear dispositive motions as the ITC
has, unnecessary delays and abuse can be reduced.
Furthermore, by channeling dispositive motions that
do not require intensive fact discovery into an early, set
period, courts can manage against the risk of endless
serially filed dispositive motions, except for good cause.
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Again, this intervention is something that could be
promoted in a variety of ways, including by publicizing
the results of the ITC’s pilot program and expanding
some version of it to the Patent Pilot Program, with its
outcomes measured and promoted, if successful.
Where possible, prompt rulings in general can provide
relief to parties. To be fair, judges have heavy dockets
with many pressing non-patent items. However, ruling
from the bench as soon as practicable after a Markman
hearing has taken place, rather than months later, can
capture considerable savings for the court which does
not have to refamiliarize itself with the details of the
case, and by helping the parties structure subsequent
actions and settlements based on an understanding of
what the case is about.78 Patent risk can also be managed
not only through early disposition, but early disclosure,
perhaps under seal, of financial information from which
damages exposure can be cabined.79 Companies should
be able to tell their boards the exposure from suit they
face.

Recommendation 3: Make patent risks more
manageable for startups.
How: Require demand letters and complaints to disclose
the real-party in interest, claim charts, related litigations
and reviews, and licenses that could cover the target,
and promoting transparency in demand letters.

Heightened Pleading/Demand Standards
Another source of unnecessary expense and perceived
risk is generated when a startup receives a demand letter
New America Foundation

and cannot tell what claims of the patent form the basis
of the demand, what particular product is being accused
or the theory of infringement, what licenses the patent is
already covered by, who the real party in interest behind
the assertion is, whether the patent is in past or present
litigation, or whether the patent is subject to an ongoing
administrative review. If a company understands that
the basis for infringement is another’s technology, as
survey respondents reported was the case 40% of the
time, their set of options—e.g. demanding indemnity
from the supplier or design around—changes. Or if they
know that the patent is the subject of a patent review, or
that the patent has been licensed to certain suppliers of a
product, the accused company can use this information
to assess its risk. If they know who the real party in
interest is, the target can research the other holdings and
activities of the party, and better estimate its exposure
and its options.
These basic facts can be costly for members of the
public, especially those with little experience with
the patent system, to obtain. However, they are well
within the knowledge and ability of the patent holder
to communicate. With that additional information, a
target can focus on assessing the risks of infringement
on the merits, rather than on bridging the information
asymmetry that frequently characterize patent
assertions. Congress should consider requiring them.
Congressional proposals to increase the quality of
litigation pleadings should apply to demand letters as
well.80 Congress should consider requiring, when a
party makes a demand or files suit, the basic information
described above. Failure to do so would be tantamount
to failing to comply with other administrative
requirements for keeping a patent in force, i.e. paying
maintenance fees, with the same sort of administrative
penalties available for non-compliance. These sorts
of requirements would leverage existing regulatory
infrastructure and apply narrowly to asserted patents,
rather than all patents.
Alternatively or in addition, the PTO and other agencies
The Open Technology Institute

with patent information should also, in accordance
with President Obama’s directives, work to provide
authoritative information about patents and options for
responding that the many companies receiving demand
letters can rely upon. Who the real party is behind
the assertion, whether the patent is in past or present
litigation, or whether the patent is subject to an ongoing
administrative review is information that could be made
more readily accessible. By promoting transparency in
demand letters in partnership with private sector actors,
this information can also be shared.81

Recommendation 4: Make startups less
attractive targets.
How: Limit the liability of small defendants and
downstream users, and the precedential vale of the
settlements signed by small companies.
Companies with shallow pockets are typically not the
favored target of lawsuits. However, survey respondents
identified two motives that may be present for pursuing
startups and small companies for patent infringement,
as users and suppliers: (1) nuisance value (“trolls know
enough to peg [the] license fee just below [the] cost to
fight”), and (2) precedential value (“[Patent holders]
go after startup companies to establish case precedent.
Startups quickly agree to settle for a low amount because
they have no money with which to stand up against an
expensive legal battle. [The patent holder] then attacks
larger companies for money, using those previously
established case precedents”).
One thing that would make startups less attractive
targets for nuisance demands is for Congress to
provide some sort of statutory limitation of liability or
immunity—for example that would apply to companies
with revenue under a certain threshold82 in general,
or to companies that are pursued because they are
downstream users of others’ technology.83 In the latter
case, the small company usually has worse access to
information, experts, and financial records regarding
overall infringement than the supplier of the technology,
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who should bear the responsibility for their product.
Determining the appropriate threshold would require
additional analysis and evaluation, however.
A final idea would be for the precedential value of
royalty agreements signed with small companies to be
scrutinized and rejected by courts, when appropriate,
as a fair indication of royalty rates to be set for larger
companies.

PRIVATE AND CIVIL SECTOR
OBSERVATIONS
Because this report is primarily intended for policy
audiences, it pays great attention to policy development.
However, the private and civil sectors have historically
played critical roles in curbing litigation abuses brought
by “patent speculators,” predecessors to modern day
patent “trolls.”84 When western farmers in the 1870s
found themselves the subject of visits by patent royalty
collectors, agricultural publications and newspapers
published articles to “educate the farmer so that he
would not be so easily duped by the agents” and farmer
alliances worked to lobby Congress and the public as a
result of their members’ dilemmas.85 After a sustained
period of discontent among farmers, the standard for
granting an agricultural design patent was changed.
When railroads found themselves under attack by patent
sharks, they banded together through professional
associations and, for an annual fee, mounted common
defenses, received full legal services, shared information
and patent references, helped each other avoid patents,
and collectively agreed not to settle with patent holders.86
They also lobbied various members of the government,
resulting in public disapproval of patent shark practices
and incremental changes in the law.87 These tactics were
successful, effectively ending much of the patent shark
problem.
While times have changed, many current private and
civil sector responses mirror those of the past. This
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section of the report seeks to both document existing
private and civil sector self-help tactics as well as to
share information and disseminate best practices. To
gather information about offerings, we consulted with
as many providers of patent defense services, both nonprofit and for profit, as we could find, and asked them
to describe their offerings. The result is reflected in
Appendix C-1. To gather information on what tactics
are being used to defend against NPE assertions and
how effective they are, we did extensive research and
asked a host of experts. We provide those findings in
Appendix C-2.

Private and Civil Sector Service Offerings
Focused on Reducing Risk from NPE Demands
Millions if not billions of dollars are spent on patent
defense and assertion every year, and greater efficiencies
certainly could be captured. Discrete private sector
and civil sector offerings for reducing risk from NPE
demands are largely new—most listed have been
launched in the last year—and tend to offer discrete
solutions to discrete aspects of the patent assertions as
experienced by companies with particular profiles.88 But
questions about the scalability, reach, ability to execute,
opportunity cost of experts, and lack of viable exits
for investors caution against “leaving it to the private
sector,” particularly when it comes to small companies
and startups.
Short of a comprehensive market-based solution like
insurance89 or the dramatic reduction in the costs and
inefficiencies of existing patent litigation, it is unlikely
that private sector service solution providers will be
able to reduce patent demand risks to a level at which
companies will no longer demand change from federal
lawmakers. As pointed out by one company, the
government has an important role to play as patents are
a creature of federal law, issued by a federal agency, and
interpreted by federal courts.90
Among the solution providers listed, there is an even
split between the private and civil sectors. A number
New America Foundation

Advice to small companies: Choose a more affordable counsel early on
“We made a huge mistake in choosing our counsel. We picked based on the personality of the lead trial lawyer. From day
one, we were choosing based on the person that we wanted representing us at trial and the prestige of the law firm—and
go to the board and say, “look we have a fancy lawyer.” We should have done the reverse—chosen an unfancy lawyer
from a much smaller firm, and [with a] fixed fee. If we got to the point where it looked like trial was likely, we could switch
the lawyer 3 to 6 months ahead of time. We’re a good example of how not to buy legal services.”
“Given all the issues you have to deal with at the beginning, it would be my recommendation to go much cheaper, or
even have one that is willing to go for a fixed fee. You don’t need the most prestigious firm to handle discovery.”
-Laura Smith, Intellectual Property Manager
For full testimony, see Appendix B.

of services are offered by both types of providers—for
example demand letter registry (EFF’s Trolling Effects
and ThatPatentTool), prior art searching (ArticleOne
Partners and AskPatents), and defensive litigation
counsel (PTLCN, Gerchen Keller Capital, and ipCM).
While these services tend to support or supplement
traditional legal services, others offer significantly
differentiated value propositions. One set of services
aims to work with companies to prevent patents from
being used in an “offensive” manner (IPA, DPL, LOT,
OPN, OIN). The Open Invention Network (OIN) is
the oldest, launched in 2005 and now including 600
licensees. It focuses on protecting Linux and other open
source projects through the creation of a patent crosslicense among community members. Of the others, two
have been spearheaded by Google, one by Twitter, and
the fourth by law professors Jennifer Urban and Jason
Schultz. These “private ordering” initiatives, depending
on the extent of their adoption, can significantly reduce
risks for their members; indeed the “patent détente” and
norm of non-enforcement that existed before the rise of
patent assertion entities91 did just that for large swaths
of the technology industry.
RPX is the only public company focused on patent
assertion. They “acquire and clear high-risk patents
from the open markets and out of active litigations”
but also have developed deep intelligence about the
market and patent assertions. They have recently started
The Open Technology Institute

offering an insurance product for small to mid-sized
companies; historically a lack of data on settlements,
adverse selection problems, and the difficulty of
predicting case outcomes has stymied the development
of robust insurance offerings.92 Unified Patents has
also developed an offering to proactively deter risks in
certain technology areas.
So far, no company or alliance has tried to offer the
sort of “unified front” of companies systematically
banding together to resist demands. One problem with
that business model when it was practical in the past
is that it became “too successful,” deterring claims so
effectively that it made itself obsolete. In addition, the
diversity of actors and interests in patent defense makes
unified collaborations more difficult. According to large
company in-house counsel respondents to a survey
(N=86), 23% had monetized their patents and 28%
were thinking of doing so.93 Defensive fronts covering
discrete technologies or sectors are easier to accomplish
and are contemplated or offered by a number of the
services (e.g. OIN, Unified Patents).

Self-Help Tactics
By far, the largest share of revenue going into defending
against NPE demands is captured by law firms. While
many firms do extensive amounts of patent defense
work, none to our knowledge has identified itself as
completely specialized in helping small companies deal
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with NPE demands. However, as the share of patent cases
brought by NPEs has risen, so has the level of general
experience with NPEs within the legal community.
In the popular media, tactics for responding to patent
suits like “fighting,” “ignorance,” and “public shaming”
are discussed. To disseminate information about the
usefulness of these and other tactics and their ability
to reduce costs and risks for startups, we researched
different tactics and talked to seasoned litigators at
companies, law firms, and nonprofits that have deep
experience with patent litigation, often on both sides of
assertions against small companies. The tactics, as well
as in the collective comments we collected about using
them, are summarized in Appendix C-2.
The tactics can be grouped into several different
categories: 1) keeping a low profile in demands that
are asserted against a large number of companies; 2)
the opposite, being a “scorpion”—in other words so
“poisonous” by being willing to bring ancillary attention
and claims to the case that the plaintiff moves on to
other targets; 3) getting help by joining with others,
either with respect to the specific assertions or sharing
experiences with lawmakers and others in a position
to influence the patent system; 4) reducing costs, by
carefully managing outside counsel and collaborating
where it makes sense to do so.
One size does not fit all and each company needs
to assess its own risk and situation; nevertheless the
comments provide a window into what those who have
tried have found works, and does not work.
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Appendix A: Methodology

A. Sampling Frame
In quantitative survey research, the gold standard is to pick a random sample (selection of potential respondents)
from a larger frame (list or source of the targeted respondents) that is representative of the target population. The target
respondent in this study was either an executive or an investor in a startup with experience with the patent system.
Since the subject of the study was patent assertion, which not all startups have experienced, I sought a sufficiently large
number of responses from which to observe and analyze the subject of study.
To leverage previous research efforts, I worked with a team of research assistants and a statistics consulting
firm, Tech Society Research, to develop a sample of startups and their investors based on the steps described in the
Berkeley Patent Study.1 That study drew from two primary sources: Thompson’s Venture Xpert database and Dun
and Bradstreet’s company listings with emails. Building upon the steps carried out by the Berkeley Patent Survey, we
included in our sample companies less than 10 years old with at least one email address. However, rather than limit
our search to particular industries, as did the authors of the Berkeley Patent Survey, we included companies in any
industry, for a total of 6,636 addresses, not counting opt-outs or bounced emails. In addition, we could not include
the Berkeley Patent Survey’s other key source, Dun and Bradstreet, because as part of transferring the business line to
Mergent Intellect, academic licenses to company email lists were discontinued in 2012.
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Thus, to supplement the Venture Xpert sample we added
2,373 additional email addresses, not counting opt-outs
or bounced emails, of venture capitalists provided based
on a privately-held proprietary directory of investors.
We cannot confirm how many respondents received the
email, and at least some of the messages were caught by
respondent spam filters. We also encouraged a handful
of respondents who took the survey and contacted us
expressing interest in its results to endorse the survey
and invite colleagues to participate. We do not know the
precise number of survey-takers that took the survey
in response to these solicitations. The startup survey
was also provided to listeners of a webcast that I did
for Engine Advocacy, a Silicon Valley startup advocacy
group. We received 14 survey responses from this
source.
We distributed the surveys via web survey. Web surveys
are increasingly the ‘go-to’ method for data collection
because they are much less expensive than conventional
methods, and the results are immediate. However, web
surveys also suffer from low response rates—single digit
response rates where no relationship exists between the
surveyor and the surveyed population are not unusual.2
Given our low response rate and the fact that the
sampling frame included only those companies and
investors whose e-mail addresses were known through
the methods described above, the survey results should
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not be generalized to the general population. Rather,
our sample reflects a hybrid of sampling methods—a
convenience sample (available lists) and snowball sample
(direct contacts for inviting people into the study). We
also employed a mixed methods approach3 for analyzing
the data. That is, we used the numeric results to set a
context and the open-ended comments provided by
respondents as thick description behind these numbers.
The resulting analysis is a meld of qualitative analysis
that is informed by quantitative results. While not
generalizable, the results are instructive for describing
concerns and impacts of patent demands. The yield
from these efforts is presented in Table A, above.

B. Data Collection
We distributed the survey via SurveyMonkey, and sent
up to eight reminder emails in the case of the startup
branch of the survey, and up to four reminder emails in
the case of the VC branch. To encourage participation
in the study, we gave survey respondents the option to
receive a copy of the survey results and also told them
that the purpose of the survey was to gather input for
a report intended for lawmakers and the members of
the startup community. However, given cost and related
constraints, we did not provide additional incentives.
We did not precede or follow-up email invitations by
postal mail or telephone.
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C. Survey Design
We invited recipients of the survey solicitation to
participate if they had experience with patents or patent
assertion, positive or negative. We asked questions
pertaining to a variety of aspects of the patent system,
ranging from the reading of patents, to sources consulted
to obtain information about patents, to licensing and
patenting behavior and attitudes, to experiences with
patent assertion. We asked questions pertaining to
“NPEs” (non-practicing entities) which we defined in
the survey as “an entity that asserts patents as a business,
not including universities or startups” or “a company
that asserts patents, rather than makes products, as a
business.”
This paper focuses on the impacts of assertions on
innovation and young companies; reports on other
topics will be released at a later date. In the case of the
startup branch of the survey, question modules were
provided based on the companies’ experiences – for
example if a company answered “no” to the question of
whether it had reserved an assertion, it would not get
questions about the impacts and its responses to the
assertions. In the case of the venture capitalist branch of
the survey, question modules were developed for better
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response rates; the version of the questions received
depended solely on when the respondent took the
survey.

D. Respondent Profiles
a. Venture Capitalist Respondent Profiles
We asked venture capitalists to identify their areas
of investment and the stage of company of primary
investment. Normalizing the numbers to add to 100%
(multiple responses were allowed), the highest share of
respondents among company types were seed or early
stage investors (74%) (Fig. 1), and among industries,
were investors in software/internet (46%) (Fig. 2).4
The respondent group was skewed from the national
average in two ways: it had a higher percentage of seed
and early stage investors (74% in the sample vs. 52% on
average) (Fig. 1), and an overrepresentation of biotech
and pharma (23% vs. 13% on average) and hardware/
semiconductor investors (15% vs. 9% on average),
relative to the number of 2012 deals (Fig. 2). The skew
in these industries may be explained by the known
importance of patents to the biopharma industry,
relative to others and the prevalence of patents in the
semiconductor and hardware industries.5
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In order to observe any industry effects, for certain
views we reported the responses of IT (software/
internet, hardware/semiconductor) and biopharma
(biotech/pharm and medical devices) VCs separately. If
a VC identified as investing in both, we excluded them
from both populations.
b. Startup Survey Respondents
We asked survey respondents to answer questions
about themselves and their companies. 73% responded
that they were founders or executives, and 12% were
managers. 93% of the surveyed companies were privately
held, and the industry of the respondents, similar to the
population of the VC survey, slightly skewed towards
the biopharma (17% v. 13%, on average) and hardware/
semiconductor industries (11% v. 9%, on average) (Fig.
3).

E. Survey Reporting
This study reports on the responses of startups and VCs
to the current survey. However, at times we also report
(but do not combine) the results from the companion
surveys described above as well as an earlier study I
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produced in 20126 based on a survey of 223 respondents,
79 of whom had received a patent assertion demand and
several of whom had monetized their patents through
patent assertion entities (PAEs). While containing a
number of suggestive findings, the survey was a nonrandom, non-probability sample, distributed primarily,
openly to a universe of readers of technology and law
and public interest/academic blogs that had to “optin” in order to take the survey. This study is denoted as
‘Chien 2012’ and serves as a point of comparison for the
current study.
In accordance with standard statistical practice as
applied to this study, we report results with at least 30
respondents except in the case of smaller sub-samples.7
Where we asked the respondent to select a range for ease
of answering, we recalculated the range to a midpoint
and derived averages based on that number.
In this report, we refer interchangeably to NPE and
PAE, which we understand and believe our survey
respondents to understand does not include universities
or startups. We quote liberally from survey responses,
and have removed obvious spelling errors in order to
improve readability. We also include data on customer
New America Foundation

suits shared with us by Patent Freedom. Its methodology
is provided in Appendix D.
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Appendix B: Views from the Trenches
VCs, Startups, and Small Business Stories
Dan Ravicher, Executive Director of Public Patent
Foundation (PUBPAT)
Dan Ravicher is Executive Director of the Public Patent Foundation (PUBPAT), a non-profit founded in 2003
whose mission is to protect freedom in the patent system. PUBBAT advocates for improvements to the patent
system and educates the public about how the patent system impacts everyday life. It also undertakes specific
litigation and reexamination matters to defend individuals, non-profits, and small businesses from invalid
patents. Many of its matters have been against patents held by “trolls,” and it has resolved matters for parties in
litigation against Lodsys and Arrivalstar.

What’s it like for a small startup to receive a patent
demand?
Imagine you’re a small startup business. You have three employees, including yourself, and you make about $500K per
year in revenue. You get a patent infringement letter and are referred to some patent attorney who tells you they charge
$500 an hour and will take at least 40 to 60 hours to review the matter. Then, if you want this attorney to respond to the
patent holder, that’s another 20 hours to write letters, do conference calls, etc. Before you know it, you’ve spent $50K
and had to lay off one of your employees. All this time the patent holder is offering to settle for $20 to 40K. What are
you going to do?

Which of the different ideas out there would make a difference to your clients?
Our clients don’t have the financial ability to hire any patent attorneys to represent them, so proposals that merely create
more legal mechanisms for challenging patents or deterring them through litigation won’t be of any help. Rather, my
clients need a system that provides pro bono legal counsel or shelter from such risks, either through an exemption or
immunity under patent law, or informally through some private risk sharing arrangement like insurance. Individuals,
non-profits, and small businesses don’t have the money, or the time, to get involved in protracted patent litigation, so
proposals like fee-shifting won’t help, because they will never get there.

What private sector solution do you favor?
In most other areas of the law we have a solution called insurance. A small business buys liability insurance to protect
against customers who get injured in their store or using their products. They get insurance for workman’s comp,
discrimination claims, etc. If and when they get sued, the insurance company has the deep pockets to defend them.
And since the patent holder may be targeting many of the insurance company’s clients, they have an incentive to play
hardball. That alone will cause the nickel and dime trolls (as I call them) who focus on small companies to go away.
There are many benefits risk consolidation can provide, including overall risk reduction though policy and doctrinal
changes that only an insurance company can have sufficient resources and incentives to effectively pursue. But, the
mere aggregation of risk produces an efficiency gain as well while effectively allowing disparate small businesses to
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work together to fight common enemies.
For example, in the automobile context, you have thousands of potential plaintiffs suing thousands of potential defendants.
So, the insurance companies can use actuarial data to assess value of claims and realize the benefits of spending more to
fight a case than it is worth because the overall deterrent effect to other minor claims resulting from that reputation they
establish for themselves. Similarly, if there was an insurer offering patent infringement defense insurance either as an addon or part of general business liability insurance, then those insurers will have the resources and incentives to fight any
minor claim made against any of their insured so as to establish a habit of not paying out minor claims.
Insurance is critical for businesses to survive the gamut of tort and employee suits they’re constantly subject to. So long
as there are plenty of small claims being made to make the transaction cost of insurance worthwhile, it can solve the
patent nuisance claim problem, too. Also, with IP claims, insurers could offer only policies to cover the cost of defense,
not any underlying liability or loss of business resulting from an injunction. They could also cap their payments to $1M
in expenses. That’s enough to mount a defense to a nuisance suit troll and make them go away.

What public sector solution(s) do you favor?
Much like states are immune from patent infringement under the 11th Amendment, Congress could establish an
exemption for micro businesses (revenues under, say, $1 to 10M per year) from patent infringement. Any business that
small can’t afford to hire patent attorneys to defend themselves, and it isn’t really worth it to the patent holder to litigate
either, as the potential damages is less than $10 to 100K. For trolls suing or threatening such businesses, their purpose
is solely to extract a nuisance payment, and while that violates Rule 11, no small business will be able to afford to hire
an attorney to pursue a Rule 11 claim on their behalf. It would cost at least $100K and take at least two years to pursue
a Rule 11 finding, which no small business is ever going to be able to take advantage of.
So, why not just categorically exempt micro businesses from patent infringement? To implement that, the law could
require any notice letters or complaints alleging patent infringement to specifically inform the recipient/defendant that
the exemption exists along with a form declaration that can be returned by the recipient swearing they qualify for the
exemption. Any letter that doesn’t include the notice and form of declaration does not qualify for purposes of putting
the recipient on notice and any complaint served without the notice and form of declaration is to be dismissed by the
Court on its own initiative without motion or appearance by the defendant. A party filing a lawsuit, when they file
the affidavit of service, must also file an affidavit that the notice of exemption and form declaration was served on the
defendant as well.
Also, one of the most critical problems is the issuance of so many invalid patents by the Patent Office. The PTO makes
ten times as much money from granting patents as it does from denying patents, and examiners have a much easier
time making their quota by granting patents, because no one objects, than from rejecting a patent and defending that
rejection repeatedly. Until the incentives placed on the office and its employees to grant, rather than deny, patents
are addressed, there will be too many invalid patents issued that can be strategically used by their holders to extract
undeserved settlements from others.

What advice would you give to lawmakers about reforming patent law?
As you think about proposals, really ask yourself how what you’re considering would help the small businesses who
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can’t afford legal work. Focus on that person, who’s being targeted by the nickel and dime trolls (as I call them), which
are a completely different beast from the home run tolls (as I call them) who want to sue deep pockets on purpose to
get a big judgment. I’m not worried about the deep pocket trolls so much because the deep pockets they sue will be
able to hire lawyers and defend themselves.
Eliminate injunctions entirely, as the patent system is an economic tool, not a civil liberty. There is always some
amount of money that can adequately compensate a patentee for infringement (i.e. a trillion dollars would never be
declined by a rational patentee). Thus, courts should not be focused on whether to grant an injunction, but instead
what amount of ongoing royalty to require the infringer to pay.
Change the incentives at the PTO to grant patents. The decision to grant or deny a patent should be entirely uninfluenced
by any macro or micro level economic concern. The fee structure and quota system both need substantial revision.

Laura Smith, Intellectual Property Manager
Names and details have been been changed to protect the identity of the author.
I was Intellectual Property Manager of a Boston-based venture backed company with around 500 employees and
$40M/year revenue at its peak competing in a fast-paced environment. We were sued by an individual inventor, fatherson team. They had filed a large number of patents and weren’t doing anything with the technology.
We knew within about 24 hours of the original suit being filed that we did not infringe, because the inventor included
a strongly worded disclaimer in his specification. So we did not settle upfront. From our perspective it was an open
and shut case.
But it took a year to get to a claim construction where we could make the case. In this first year we spent about 100K
a month. That was bad enough. But then the judge sat on it. During this time we went through discovery at a run-rate
of $200k per month. We were a startup not making a profit. But if we were, that amount would have been a significant
portion of it.
A year and a half later, the judge FINALLY issued our claim construction ruling. He was not able to provide any
reasoning or analysis in his opinion and stated that, “with trial in this matter rapidly approaching, the court does not
wish to add further delay to the constructions by its preparation of a complete opinion setting forth its reasoning and
analysis.” So, he realized he was taking way too long and decided to simply issue his ruling without a full opinion.
To make matters worse, his ruling made it infinitely clear that we CANNOT POSSIBLY INFRINGE. We knew this
from the start. So not only did we spend $3 million in fees waiting around for a claim construction, but when it finally
arrived it was clear the plaintiff had no case and the whole exercise was a waste. The plaintiff immediately stipulated
to non-infringement.
Meanwhile, the guys filed suit over another two patents. They filed for these patents after the benefit of the Markman
hearing during which the inventor sat there and got an eight hour tutorial on how to write a better patent on our
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technology. He then went home and did it. Of course, he claimed priority to much earlier applications with 70 to 80
page disclosures.
When faced with the second suit, we knew we would spend all this money again to go into this entire process, and we
would pay all that money and be worse off. So even though we had won the first time, the second time it was much
more attractive to settle—in the low seven figures—than to fight.
We had run out of cash and were in talks with a Chinese company that didn’t want to deal with it. All of the arguments—
there’s just no way in hell a jury will pay attention it. We had agreed on the price of the company. But then the buyer
used the lawsuit as leverage to get the price down on the order of $10 million due to the outstanding lawsuit– 20% of
the value of the company. They said this is a $20M liability which was bogus. But we didn’t have the money to settle it.

What can be done?
Issue claim construction on the day of the ruling
Right after this case, the judge changed his practice. Now he issues claim construction on the day of the ruling. That
would have saved us a lot of pain.
This should be a requirement, that you get it done right then. You’ll never have a better understanding of the case than
on that day. The longer you wait, the more unfamiliar the material becomes. Even if we had lost, we would have written
the check and settled, rather than spending another $1.5M on discovery.

Advice to small companies: Chose a more affordable counsel early on
We made a huge mistake in choosing our counsel. We picked based on the personality of the lead trial lawyer. From
day one, we were choosing based on the person that we wanted representing us at trial and the prestige of the law
firm—and go to the board and say, “look we have a fancy lawyer.” We should have done the reverse—chosen an
unfancy lawyer from a much smaller firm, and with a fixed fee. If we got to the point where it looked like trial was
likely, we could switch the lawyer 3 to 6 months ahead of time. We’re a good example of how not to buy legal services.
Given all the issues you have to deal with at the beginning, it would be my recommendation to go much cheaper, or
even have one that is willing to go for a fixed fee. You don’t need the most prestigious firm to handle discovery.

Don Ellson, Private Equity Investor
Don Ellson (not his real name) is a Principal at a private equity firm with over a decade of experience investing
in early-stage high-tech companies.
Two of our companies have sold patents to NPEs. The first company has been around a long time, so its patents are
old. It has now been on the receiving end of three lawsuits by NPEs; in all three we were forced to settle. The suits were
devastating to the company—they almost killed the company.
The Open Technology Institute
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One suit hit the company at a very vulnerable time and almost put it out of business. The company learned a lot
from these experiences and turned around and started licensing to NPEs. The first time they did it, they needed
the money. But then—this is going to sound like prostitution—they realized this was an opportunity to bring more
resources into the company... Since the first sale, they have periodically looked at their portfolio, and sold groups of
patents to different litigation entities. Another lawsuit the company had was actually from a NPE that acquired a patent
from another one of our portfolio companies. I learned this while in the due diligence process while investing in the
company that sold. The person who sold that patent recently told me he regrets selling it, and the company has made a
point of not pursuing any additional patent licensing.
Net-net, I wish we had never been on either offense or defense. I think the company would have been better off had it
never been sued for infringement and never sold patents. In fact, the benefit of selling patents—their own use of the
system—didn’t offset the pain of the lawsuits.
I think patent trolls have a very negative impact for a couple of reasons. First, companies have been forced to spend a
lot of money that would have otherwise gone into innovation, either because they are defending patents, or filing and
managing patents—an expensive process in its own right. It’s also creating friction in the acquisition process. Buyers
are warier because they are worried about buying a company and getting sued. On a lot of fronts, it’s been a negative
on innovation and I don’t see it anywhere as driving innovation. In certain areas—in pharma—patents work. In the
software world, it’s very much been a negative. I’d rather there be no patents than the current system. Everyone I know
shares the view that trolls are having a negative impact on innovation.

Kate Endress, Founder and CEO of Ditto.com
Kate Endress is an athlete turned investor turned e-commerce entrepreneur.
After graduating from Stanford Business School in 2011, Kate cofounded
DITTO.com, an ecommerce site selling designer sunglasses and eyewear
which features cutting edge new video “try-on” technology.

Who are you and why did you partner with a patent troll?
I am the CEO and Cofounder of DITTO.com, a company I started to make ecommerce work for verticals that had
currently not migrated online – those with fitted merchandise. After raising a seed round, my founders and I worked
countless hours to build our team, file for patents on our technology, and build a scalable website. We launched our
site in April 2012 featuring fitted eyewear and were off to the races.
We were planning to raise a Series A round during the summer of 2013 but before we could, we were sued for patent
infringement by our biggest competitor, Wellpoint, who owns 1-800-Contacts and Glasses.com. Just like that, we were
faced with an “injunction” threat from a $25B competitor. I was terrified our years of hard work were for naught.
As it turns out, after seeing our technology, Wellpoint launched its own offering and immediately bought a patent
which they are now using to sue us. It took me some time to come to grips with that fact that a $25B healthcare
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company who carefully crafts the image of being compassionate and caring towards the consumer would go on the
aggressive against a 13-person startup. I can only speculate that they fear that the patents we filed (which take years to
issue!) will become a weapon towards them down the road. But if they would have just called me before filing a lawsuit
against us, they would know we applied for those patents for defensive purposes, not offensive ones. I care more about
building a superior customer experience than I do about going after them with patents.
I had to come up with a defense strategy. After doing our own assessment and talking with a host of talented lawyers,
we still don’t think we infringe. But how expensive it would be! Every attorney I spoke with estimated it would take
several million dollars over several years to prove that we didn’t infringe. Obviously we weren’t a position to be able
to afford that! I stopped all marketing spending to ensure every dollar went to support our litigation, I laid off several
employees to further stem costs, and then I went searching for someone who could help.
I worked my tail off to find a lawyer to work for equity on my case, to no avail. Several were willing to take half equity
or quarter equity in my company but it wasn’t enough given their outrageous hourly fees. I had one lawyer friend who
was going to quit his job at his big firm to work to for me, but I realized one young litigator from Indiana wasn’t going
to be enough to battle this $20B company in Utah. When you get sued in Utah, you must have a Utah-based litigator
to defend you, which was difficult given that we are located in the Bay Area. I also worked hard to find an investor
to fund our fight, but the feedback was consistent: “You have a $25B competitor who put a target on your back. Why
wouldn’t they just keep purchasing patents to keep suing you to run you out of business? It’s too risky.” The fact that
legal fees are often sunk costs (given that there isn’t a fee-shifting mechanism in place yet) also makes it harder to raise
money for litigation.
I even went so far as to run a sale process for my business, which was incredibly depressing. Buyers were dinging our
valuation $3 to 4M for the lawsuit, so I felt we couldn’t even sell it for what it was worth.
It was a challenging five months as I figured out a game plan that gave us a path forward and a shot. That solution was
a deal with Erich Spangenberg. Many people think of Erich as a patent troll. I met him while speaking as a panelist at
a patent reform conference a few months ago and my first reaction to him was probably exactly what you think. I had
a clenched jaw and a red neck (I’m the worst poker player ever because I literally wear my emotions). But we got to
speaking and he told me that as he heard me speak, he realized that there was an incredible opportunity. He went on
to explain his plan to take on my case, pay for all legal expenses associated with it, and free me up to run my business
in exchange for equity in my business on a contingency basis for about half of what I was projecting it would cost me
in cash to fight it myself. I was skeptical at first, but the more diligence I did on him and this deal, the more I realized
it was a very smart (if not opportunistic) market-based solution to my problem. His offer made sense because 1) it
makes us less vulnerable due to his reputation and resources, so it reduces the chance of being sued over and over; 2)
the price we negotiated was fair given the circumstances; 3) he has real domain expertise and an arbitrage opportunity
on costs; 4) he has a much higher likelihood to negotiate our lawsuit away given his resources and assets; 5) I could
go back to running my business and not be neck-deep in litigation for a few years, which would have created huge
negative consequences for my company and team.
Erich Spangenberg sees this as an opportunity to get equity in great startups for doing what he does best. So until the
day that we have a properly functioning patent system, his solution is my best option. When a huge company puts a
target on your back, sometimes you need to powerful friends to have a shot at surviving.
The Open Technology Institute
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Brad Burnham, Union Square Ventures
Brad Burnham is a managing partner at Union Square Ventures (USV), an early stage venture capital firm based
in New York City focused on young companies that use information technology in innovative ways to create high
growth business opportunities. Over the past 10 years, it has been directly involved in the development of 61
companies and has, through its prior firms, participated in the launch of over 120 companies.

Union Square Ventures
Union Square Ventures, founded in 2003, is a venture capital firm based in New
York City.
The firm currently manages $450,000,000 across three funds. Companies
in Union Square Ventures investment portfolio include Twitter, Tumblr, Etsy,
Foursquare and Kickstarter, among others.
NOTE: The following is adopted from testimony provided to the FTC/DOJ at their workshop on Patent Assertion Entities
on December 10, 2012.
I’m an investor who invests primarily in internet services. With that I come to this question with a unique perspective.
We were, for instance, the first institutional investor in Twitter, Tumblr, Foursquare, Etsy, four companies that have
now created over 1,500 jobs. I have become very involved in the patent question, because about one-third of our
portfolio—we have 45 companies in the portfolio—has been sued by someone. About almost half has been given some
kind of demand letter by someone.
Twitter for instance has 14 active patent actions against it—once you get to a certain scale, everybody comes out of
the woodwork and asserts that you have violated their intellectual property. What’s frustrating about this from my
perspective as an investor is that none of these companies that we have invested in knew about these patents. And I’ve
heard arguments made that, well, gosh, they were irresponsible. They could have searched the patent office to find
these patents. But in fact, that really is not true. Most of the patents that have been asserted were asserted from an
entirely different field.
I’ll use one example of a company that is not entirely out of business, but is a tiny shell of its former self as a result
of being subjected to two patent suits in rapid succession by two different entities, neither of which would fit the
definition of an NPE or a PAE. Both were failed entrants. Both were failed start-ups. The company was in the business
of providing advertising services to major brands. The first suit that we were hit with was from a company that was not
in the business of advertising services at all. It was a business-to-business company that was providing software, not
services, to a completely different industry—law enforcement. There’s no way we could have searched for that patent.
The second suit we were hit with also was so completely different than what we were doing. That hurt when they sued
us. But it didn’t have a huge effect. They hadn’t gotten an injunction.
But then they went on to sue our customers. So these are people like American Express and American Airlines, and
General Motors. The company in question employed 70 people. We were doing about $10 million in annual revenue,
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and when they sued our customers, this was a nice to have, not a need to have, it was a marketing program for the
customers. The suits cut our revenue in half in three months. And so we couldn’t sustain the 70 people that we had on
the payroll, and so we had to cut the company in half.
And as we fought this patent suit, we tried to indemnify our customers. Our customers said “Thanks, but I mean, it’s
not going to help. It’s not worth it for me. I don’t want to be involved in this. You figure it out.”
And so ultimately we were not able to raise additional capital into the company, and we ultimately shrunk the company
back to five. The company now has five people servicing their existing clients, and no longer employing those 70, or
65 people that they had employed.
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Appendix C-1: Patent Defense Service Providers/Offerings

(Each description provided by listed entity.)

Name/Service
Provider
Patent Troll Law Clinic
Network (PTLCN)
(Application Developers
Alliance, a trade
association)

Service

Description & Status

Cost/How To Participate

Pro bono legal
services to
small
companies

Multistate network of law school clinics that aims to provide pro
bono services to small companies that have received a demand
letters from or been sued by a patent troll. Students (advised by
faculty and private law firm advisors) will conduct prior art
searches, infringement analyses, and related research, and advise
client entrepreneurs regarding legal options. Students will also
prepare petitions for reexamination/review that challenge patents
owned by trolls. Launch Date: Fall 2013

PTLSCN does not charge, and neither do
most (or perhaps all) law school clinics.
However, clients may be responsible for
various fees (e.g., court filing fees) associated
with their individual legal concern.

When to Use Their Services, Turnaround Time, and
Contact
Upon receiving a demand letter, and hopefully before
you contact the demanding troll. Contact: Chris Beal,
chrisb@appdevelopersalliance.org; devsbuild.it

Target Client Profile
Developers and small
companies threatened by
patent trolls.

Trolling Effects
(Electronic Frontier
Foundation, a
technology policy nonprofit)

Demand letter Essentially a database of troll demand letters that recipients have
registry and self- uploaded. The point is to provide a free resource for potential and
actual troll targets to inform themselves about the senders'
help site
identities and modus operandi. The website also provides guides
to the patent system and reform. Thus, no direct legal assistance
is provided to those under attack, but it creates transparency
around a niche of litigation that seems to thrive on a lack of such
in addition to providing general information about the litigation
process for targets that are under attack. Non-profit (project of
EFF and coalition). Launch Date: July 2013

Free. The primary audience is demand-letter
recipients who are encouraged to submit their
documents, browse other letters, and learn
more about their situation. However, to help
facilitate further research, we’ve made it easy
to export public data from the website so
academics, journalists, and policymakers can
do more thorough research.

Upon receiving a demand letter, or if an entity would
like to learn more about patent trolls. Submitted
demand letters are published within days. Otherwise,
there is no turnaround time. Contact: Adi Kamdar,
adi@eff.org; trollingeffects.org

Recipients of demand
letters.

PatentFreedom

NPE
intelligence

A basic subscription costs $10,000/year, and
the intended audience are companies with
"limited NPE exposure", or smaller
businesses: to be eligible for the basic
subscription, a company needs to have faced
no more than 7 NPE-induced litigations over
the last three years. More expensive plans
exist for companies with higher NPE exposure
and custom research is priced on a case-bycase basis. Companies access the database
and contribute to it through the service's
website. The typical audience includes both
businesses that are targeted by NPEs and the
law firms that deal with the litigation.

Most clients will use the service upon being hit with a
demand letter so that they can learn more about the
NPE that sent it. Other clients, though, will use the
information on the website to perform risk analysis
before engaging in activities that may draw the ire of
NPEs. Submissions are posted within the week;
otherwise, once a company has a subscription they
have access to the information. Contact:
info@patentfreedom.com;
www.patentfreedom.com

Law firms and businesses
that deal with troll-induced
litigation. The baseline
seems to be 7 NPE-related
cases within 3 years.

That Patent Tool

Demand letter Similar to Trolling Effects, That Patent Tool is a website where
registry and self- companies can upload demand letters that they've received from
trolls, see demand letters that others have submitted, and
help site
anonymously discuss issues related to trolls and demand letters.
The site will provide members with a "Quarterly Troll Review" that
will draw conclusions about the trolls based on the materials that
have been submitted. The QTR will contain predictions about
possible future troll targets, as well as interviews with industry
experts. Privately held. Launch Date: June 2013
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A database of information about non-practicing entities (NPEs)
and the litigation that they bring. PatentFreedom collects
information about NPEs, their background and network of affiliated
shell entities, the patents that they assert, the defendants they
attack, and the attorneys that fight for and against them so that
targets can plan how they will respond to a demand letter.
Companies that want access to this information can subscribe to
the service. Additionally, PatentFreedom offers custom research
and advisory services for clients that desire it. Subscribers can
also contribute to the database themselves. Privately held. Launch
Date: 2008

The site as-is is free to use, though users
Upon receiving a demand letter. Contact: Steph
need to become members. There are future
Kennedy, skennedy@898data.com;
products and services in development that
www.thatpatenttool.com
may cost members, though the first 50 to sign
up for and submit demand letters to That
Patent Tool receive all future tools free.

Any company, small or
large, that has received a
patent demand letter. Law
firms who, on behalf of their
clients, would like to track
patent trolls.
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Name/Service
Provider
Article One Partners

Service

Ask Patents
(StackExchange)

Crowd-sourced
questionanswer service
for U.S. Patent
Applications
and U.S.
Patents

Ask Patents is a free web service where users both pose
The website is free. Users simply visit the site
questions relating to the patent system and answer the questions and ask/answer questions.
of others. Prior art questions represent the most frequently-posed
requests, but questions are often asked about other areas, such
as patentability and infringement. The community is focused on
prior art searches for software patent applications in the U.S., but,
given the format, it can potentially address any issue that the
patent system could present an innovator. The community is
focused on finding prior art for US Software Patent Applications.
However, anytime someone posts an issued software patent
which is currently in litigation by a known troll they see a lot of
answers. Because of the uniquely strong SEO position of Ask
Patents (and the Stack Exchange network generally), if a prior art
request has been posted on Ask Patents it is very likely to be one
of the top two results on Google and other search engines.
Examiners are free to google a patent number as part of their nonpatent-literature diligence and they are free to look at the answers
on Ask Patents and form an opinion as to whether the answers are
good prior art for the subject application. Non-profit. Launch Date:
2012

Anytime you have a concern about a pending U.S.
Entities concerned with a
patent application, whoever it is held by. The first
pending U.S. patent
answer to a prior art search question is usually posted application
within 3 hours of the question's posting. Contact: Micah
Siegel, msiegel@stackoverflow.com;
patents.stackexchange.com

Defensive Patent
License (DPL)

Patent License

The DPL is an off-the-shelf license that focuses on defensive
commitments. Each licensor agrees to offer licensees full royaltyfree access to her portfolio in return for a reciprocal commitment to
do the same. With each new licensor, the network of permanently
defensive patents grows. Entities outside the network can still be
pursued offensively. Importantly, the DPL’s obligations “travel with
the patent” so that in the event of sale or other transfer, its new
owner must also abide by the DPL’s terms. This ongoing
obligation could help limit lawsuit risk, especially for the risks
posed by patent trolls, as a patent that can only be used
defensively is likely to have less value for a troll. Planning to
launch as a non-profit. Launch Date: November 2013 (Anticipated)

Companies should use the DPL as part of their overall
patent strategy. Contact: Jason Schultz,
SchultzJ@exchange.law.nyu.edu;
www.defensivepatentlicense.com
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Description & Status

Crowd-sourced Article One Partners, the world’s largest patent research
patent research community, has revolutionized the transparency of patent data.
Clients use the power of the AOP crowd to defend in litigation and
assess validity positions for all use cases across the patent
lifecycle. Privately held. Launch Date: 2008

Cost/How To Participate
Article One Partners has products to fit the
budget and litigation stage needs of clients,
from $2,000 to $7,000 for private searches to
$25,000 for full crowdsourced research. AOP
also offer strategic memberships to clients
from worldwide brands to start-ups.

The license will be freely available. There are
also plans for a pro bono network of patent
prosecutors who will waive their fees for
patentees committed to the DPL.

When to Use Their Services, Turnaround Time, and
Contact
Services may be used in pre-litigation or litigation
defense, USPTO proceedings such as Inter Partes
Review or Covered Business Method patent review
proceedings, ITC defense, due diligence, analysis of
industry standards, evidence of use, patent
purchasing, or customized to meet clients' needs.
Article One Partners research can be completed in as
little as two business days, and generally is completed
in 5 weeks with the crowd optimizing the research.
Contact: www.articleonepartners.com;
www.go.articleonepartners.com/request-a-quote

Target Client Profile
Clients range from individual
app developers to global
companies, including 18 of
the top 25 companies most
pursued by NPEs.

Any company that wants to
make a commitment to
defensive patenting and use
network effects to limit
patent risk overall. The DPL
is especially well suited for
companies and individuals
who do not plan to monetize
or assert their patents
offensively.
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Name/Service
Service
Provider
Open Patent NonLegallyassertion (OPN) Pledge enforceable
non-assertion
agreement

Description & Status

Cost/How To Participate

The OPN Pledge is an agreement by Google (for now) to not
assert certain patents against those using them for open-source
software. Once a patent has been pledged, the pledge becomes
legally binding on whomever owns the patent; thus, if Google were
to sell or otherwise transfer rights to the patent, the pledge would
still apply to the subsequent owner. Anybody can then use the
patent without fear of a legal attack as long as they meet the
conditions of the pledge. Google also retains the right to
defensively terminate the pledge if one of the developers or users
attacks or benefits from a patent attack against Google. This
allows Google to fight back against companies that use shell
corporations or proxies to assert their patent rights. Ideally, in the
future, more patent owners, such as large corporations, developer
organizations, and newer growing companies, will pledge their
patents along with Google's in order to encourage innovation in
the open-source environment. Publicly held (originally developed
by Google, but is available for any other patent owner to adopt).
Launch Date: March 2013

As long as a developer or user is utilizing the
patent rights as the pledge dictates, there is
no cost. For companies wishing to adopt the
pledge, there may be some costs associated
with selecting patents for pledging.

The parties to the agreement will split the
administrative costs, which are expected to be
low and capped (less than $20k/year/party).
Potential members need only sign on to the
agreement and pay their share of the
administrative costs.

License On Transfer
(LOT) Agreement/
Google

License upon
Transfer of
Patents

Google is gathering a group of companies together to enter into
this LOT agreement, which will be administered by an
independent organization. Under the terms of the LOT
agreement, every LOT User agrees that when it transfers a patent,
the transferred patent automatically becomes licensed to the other
LOT Users existing at the time of the transfer, except (i) a transfer
that is part of a legitimate M&A activity or (ii) a transfer to another
LOT User. This structure protects LOT Users from being subject to
the extraction of patent rents by the entity (e.g., a patent assertion
entity) to which the patent is sold. Launch Date: Fall 2013
(Anticipated)

Innovator's Patent
Agreement (IPA)

Agreement to
only assert
patents
defensively

The IPA is a new way to do patent assignments that keeps control Free
in the hands of engineers and designers. It is a commitment from
Twitter, and other companies, to their employees that patents can
only be used for defensive purposes. If the patent is asserted for
any other reason, the IPA member will need the inventor’s
permission. Privately held. Launch Date: 2012

Docket Navigator

Searchable
online docket
database

Four main components are included in the service:
(1) The Docket Report (daily email reporting activity in the district
courts, ITC and PTAB)
(2) Docket Navigator (searchable online database)
(3) Docket Alerts (customized saved searches that alert you when
new patent litigation activity occurs)
(4) New Case Alerts (intra-day notifications of new patent cases
filed). Privately held. Launch Date: 2007
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When to Use Their Services, Turnaround Time, and Target Client Profile
Contact
Contact: OPN Pledge Team, opnpledge@google.com; Anybody developing or
g.co/opnpledge
using open source software
is a target "client" (or, more
appropriately, "pledge
recipient"). Similarly, the
OPN Pledge is targeted to
any patent owner wishing to
use patents in the service of
open source software
("pledge adopter").

Your company should consider joining the LOT
community if it:
a) Is optimistic about is future, e.g., has large or
growing revenue or plans to have large or growing
revenue
b) has a PAE problem or is likely to have one in the
future; or
c) places greater value in freedom to operate than in
pure patent sales to PAEs, e.g., if your company
doesn’t make a noticeable portion of its revenue from
pure patent sales to PAEs. Contact:
LOT@google.com;
www.google.com/patents/licensing/lot

Any operating company or
startup that is optimistic
about its future.

Companies should join the IPA as part of their overall
patent strategy. Information:
https://blog.twitter.com/2013/brewing-our-firstinnovator%E2%80%99s-patent-agreement-patent-0

Company should consider
joining the IPA to assure
their employees that their
patents will be used only as
a shield rather than as a
weapon.

The service utilizes a subscription-based
If concerned with pending or potential patent litigation.
pricing model based on the number of users. Contact: Amy Towell, amy@docketnavigator.com;
For example, a single user is $55 per month, www.docketnavigator.com
and the aggregate monthly cost gradually
increases based on the number of users, up to
100+ users, priced at $1,000 per month.

Companies and individuals
concerned with patent
litigation.
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Name/Service
Provider
Unified Patents Inc.
(Unified)

When to Use Their Services, Turnaround Time, and
Contact
NPE assertion Unified reduces the risk and cost of NPEs on behalf of companies Membership is free for startups and costs a
Unified is actively defending a number of technologies
and litigation
in specific technology areas of high NPE activity. Unified monitors modest annual fee for large companies.
experiencing high NPE activity. Companies can join
reduction
NPEs in these areas and uses annual subscription fees
Unified’s members only subscribe to (and pay Unified at any time to reduce their risk and cost of NPE
through deterre toproactively defend against NPE activity. Rather than encourage for) technology areas relevant to their
activity. Contact: Kevin Jakel,
nce
NPEs through settlement, Unified deters or eliminates future NPE business, thereby delivering strategic ROI.
CEO, kevin@unifiedpatents.com; www.unifiedpatents.c
activity, thereby reducing NPE risk and cost. Privately held.
om
Launch Date: Early 2013

Gerchen Keller Capital

Litigation
finance
solutions

GKC offers defense-side financing solutions for all types of legal
claims, including patent claims. In addition to investing in
meritorious litigation, GKC assists parties in evaluating the
strengths and weaknesses of litigation claims or defenses, the
potential costs of litigation, the range of potential damage awards,
and the expected economic benefit or cost of maintaining
particular claims or defenses. Privately held. Launch Date: April
2013

The cost of services depends upon a variety of
factors, including the merits of the claim or
defense and the estimated time to a
resolution. With respect to small companies,
the arrangements can provide for repayment
over time or compensation through equity or
other means.

Funding alternatives are available from the moment
litigation is contemplated or threatened until after final
judgment is entered. Contact: Travis Lenkner,
tdl@gerchenkeller.com; www.gerchenkeller.com

Clients are commercial
enterprises that want to
offset risks associated with
litigation and litigation
defense. A typical case
involves potential damages
of at least $10 million.

RPX

Preemptive
open market
patent
acquisition

The RPX network can provide measurable risk and cost reduction
for any company experiencing NPE litigation. All members of the
network pay an annual fee (scaled to reflect the size of the
member company) which is used to acquire and clear high-risk
patents from the open markets and out of active litigations.
Publicly held. Launch Date: 2008

Membership fees start at $75,000, and scale
depending upon size of the company. In
certain cases, RPX will consider special
circumstances for start-ups or early-stage
companies. RPX Insurance is also priced to
reflect small company circumstances and is
based on specific forward-looking risk for each
policyholder as determined by their actuarial
models.

RPX’s preemptive open market patent acquisitions are
the most efficient way to deploy the network’s capital
and provide the most attractive ROI for members, so
joining the network early and benefiting from their
ongoing acquisitions is the most effective strategy.
Member companies also benefit from RPX's ability to
intervene in active litigations. The goal is to provide
members the broadest and most cost-effective risk
mitigation possible. A company can become an RPX
member at any time. Ideally, contact with RPX would
initiate before engaging legal counsel. Contact:
info@rpxcorp.com; rpxcorp.com

Any company facing a
litigation claim or wishing to
resolve a current or potential
assertion/litigation without
incurring high defense or
settlement costs. Whether
RPX serves as the
intermediary to purchase out
of the open market or in
relation to a litigation, RPX
brings to bear its expertise
to help ensure that its clients
are able to take a more
efficient and cost-effective
approach to handling NPE
litigation.

IP Claims Management Litigation
(ipCM)
financing,
management
and strategic
advisory

For smaller companies that are in the early stages of dealing with
actual patent litigation. ipCM also offers a unique financial product
that is priced to reflect the imminent risk of each particular
company with payment only upon success. Privately held (an
affiliate of IPNav). Launch Date: May 2013

Payment can be in equity (typically half of
what the expected legal bill to be valued at the
company's latest rounds valuation) or cash. If
ipCM fails, the company pays nothing.

Companies can use ipCM services at any time--before
or after litigation is commenced. Evaluation within
days. Contact: info@ipcmadvisors.com; Website
forthcoming

Ones that are tired of paying
law firms with valuable cash
with no guarantee of
success.
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Service

Description & Status

Cost/How To Participate

Target Client Profile
Any company in a
technology area which has
or is concerned with NPE
activity.

New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute

Name/Service
Provider
Open Invention
Network (OIN)

Service

Description & Status

Fully paid-up
royalty licence

Provides a fully paid-up royalty free license to OIN pro-competitive Free to become a licensee.
defensive patent pool in exchange for a commitment to forbear
litigation around Linux and to cross-license its own patents to
other members. OIN holds over 400 U.S. patents and applications
and has nearly 600 licensees that are part of its growing
community of entities committed to patent non-aggression in open
source and Linux. Privately held. Launch Date: 2005

Allied Security Trust I
(AST)

Defensive
patent
availability
monitoring and
purchasing

Monitoring of the high tech secondary patent market and collective For companies $4B or larger in annual
defensive purchasing of patent assets. Launch Date: January 1, product/service revenue, $150K one time fee
2007
plus $200K annual fee. For companies
between $250M and $4B, $150K annual fee.
Membership fees have the potential to go
down as AST grows.
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Cost/How To Participate

When to Use Their Services, Turnaround Time, and
Contact
Anytime your company is engaged in Linux or opensource activities. Contact: Keith Bergelt,
kbergelt@openinventionnetwork.com;
http://www.openinventionnetwork.com/about.php

When your company wants a cost effective solution to
monitor patents available on the secondary patent
market and to secure freedom to operate through a
defensive license at a lower cost through a
collaborative bid with other similarly situated operating
companies. Contact: Linda Biel, lbiel@ast1.com;
www.alliedsecuritytrust.com

Target Client Profile
Any company with an
interest in open source
software.

Operating companies in the
high tech industry.

New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute

Appendix C-2: Tactics for Responding to Patent Assertions
To disseminate best practices and information we developed a list of tactics for responding to a NPE suit culled from interviews and research. We then solicited advice from experts about how these tactics fare in
practice. We received comments from attorneys practicing at lawfirms, in-house counsel, solution providers, and a public interest lawyer and summerized their feedback in the “Ask the Experts” column.
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Appendix D: PatentFreedom
Methodology for Counting Customer Suits

PatentFreedom maintains a comprehensive database of patent litigations, focusing on NPEs, which it defines
as “any entity that earns or plans to earn the majority of its revenue from the licensing or enforcement of its patents.”
PatentFreedom’s database capabilities enable it to track patent litigation campaigns that use the same set of patents
asserted against a series of operating companies over time. Using this information, the company generated a list of the
top patent litigation campaigns, based on number of defendants named, initiated between January 1, 2010 and June
30, 2013. For each of the 15 campaigns, the company identified a total of 813 patent infringement lawsuits filed as
part of the campaigns, broken into 2,889 individual operating company parties. The company tagged each operating
company party as either a ‘customer’ (implementer or end-user) or a ‘supplier’ based upon a manual review of the
following three data fields:
1. the underlying technology covered in each campaign based on a quick review of the patents-in-suit;
2. the industry of the operating company party (derived from their self-reported primary NAICS codes);
3. the allegedly infringing products captured from the filed complaints.
As an illustration, a software company, whose web-based email products (built by the company itself) were
alleged to be infringing patents covering web-based messaging features, was tagged as a ‘supplier’. On the other
hand, a retail company (whose core products/services clearly do not include email products) sued for implementing
a similar web-based messaging feature on its website based on following the instructions of a technology vendor
on its website, or a company that used an off-the-shelf product as instructed by the manufacturer, was tagged as a
‘customer’. For a minority of cases where one or more of the three data fields were not available, the company used
other available information, such as the company’s website, to estimate its industry or products and services, and
make the determination. While the majority of cases were clear, some were arguable and not easy to determine.
The company then analyzed the entire data set to calculate the percent distribution of the total number of operating
companies sued in each campaign into ‘customers’ vs. ‘suppliers.’
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